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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§78A-3-102 and 78A-4-103, Utah Code 
Annotated, and the Order of the Utah Supreme Court transferring this case to this court 
for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review by this appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in granting the defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment as a sanction against the plaintiffs pursuant to Rules 16(d) and 37(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
a. Standard of Review: The trial court's entry of summary 
judgment is reviewed for correctness, according its conclusions of law no deference. 
Summary judgment should be granted only where no genuine issues of material fact exist 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hall v. NACM 
Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97,1J9, 988 P.2d 942, 945 - 946. The trial court's 
imposition of sanctions under Rules 16 and 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty 
West Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, \9, 129 P.3d 287, 289; Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT 
App 152,135,71 P.3d 601, 612. 
b. This issue was preserved in the trial court by the plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Record ("Rec") at pp. 506 - 554) and the arguments of 
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counsel at the hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment on January 8, 2008. 
Rec. at 627. 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sanctioning the plaintiffs 
under Rules 16 and 37 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for failing to provide an expert 
report, where the trial court had already granted the plaintiffs summary judgment, and 
where the defendants also failed to provide an expert report as required by the trial court? 
a. Standard of Review: The trial court's imposition of sanctions 
under Rules 16 and 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., Inc., 2006 UT App 
48, j^9, 129 P.3d 287, 289; Depew v. Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, Tf35, 71 P.3d 601, 612. 
b. This issue was preserved in the trial court by the plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. at pp. 506 - 554), and the arguments of counsel at 
the hearing on the parties' motions for summary judgment on January 8, 2008. Rec. at 
627. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 16(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(d) Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or 
pretrial order, if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling 
or pretrial conference, if a party or a party's attorney is substantially 
unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party or a party's attorney 
fails to participate in good faith, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, 
may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any 
of the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition 
to any other sanctions, the court shall require the party or the attorney 
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representing the party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred 
because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney fees, unless 
the court finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party fails to obey an 
order entered under Rule 16(b) or if a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 
31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an order to provide or 
permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule 
or Rule 35, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, 
the court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to 
the failure as are just, including the following: 
(A) deem the matter or any other designated facts to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining 
the order; 
(B) prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated 
claims or defenses or from introducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) strike pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings until the order 
is obeyed, dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or render 
judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(D) order the party or the attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including 
attorney fees, caused by the failure; 
(E) treat the failure to obey an order, other than an order to submit to a 
physical or mental examination, as contempt of court; and 
(F) instruct the jury regarding an adverse inference. 
Rule 26(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
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(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person 
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or 
party. The report shall contain the subject matter on which the expert is 
expected to testify; the substance of the facts and opinions to which the 
expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for each opinion; the 
qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by 
the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for 
the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the 
witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(C) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days 
after the expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if 
the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same 
subject matter identified by another party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 
days after the disclosure made by the other party. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
This case concerns the plaintiffs' Petition to Void Transfer of Trust Assets and 
Award Damages which was filed in an effort to void certain payments made by Bruce 
Hughes, as trustee of the plaintiffs' mothers' trust, to companies in which Bruce Hughes 
held a pecuniary interest. Plaintiffs are beneficiaries under the trust. By their Petition in 
the trial court, the plaintiffs sought to: (a) void a payment of $6,000.00 made to an entity 
known as The Academy at Cedar Mountain ("The Academy") and require restitution of 
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such sum to the plaintiffs; (b) void a payment of $115,000.00 made to an entity known as 
Academy Equity Investors ("Academy Equity Investors") and require restitution of such 
sum to the plaintiffs; (c) require Bruce Hughes to provide an accounting of his actions as 
trustee; (d) require Bruce Hughes to make restitution to the plaintiffs of all sums and 
assets wrongfully transferred; and (e) award the plaintiffs punitive damages as against 
Bruce Hughes. Rec. at pp. 1-7. 
On December 1, 2003, the defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Defendants' First MSJ"). Rec. at pp. 52 - 167. After hearing on March 23, 2004, the 
trial court exercised its authority under Rule 56(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to 
allow more discovery in the case without ruling on the Defendants' First MSJ. Rec. at 
625, p. 14. 
On June 30, 2006, the defendants again filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Defendants' Second MSJ"). Rec. at pp. 250 - 372. The plaintiffs filed a Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs' First MSJ") and opposed the defendants' motion. 
Rec. at pp. 281 - 315. A hearing was held on the motions on November 14, 2006. A true 
and correct copy of the transcript of such hearing is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
After the hearing, the trial court, on December 12, 2006, issued its Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
In such Order, the trial court denied Defendants' Second MSJ and ruled in favor of 
plaintiffs, finding that "Because of the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the 
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buy-sell agreements, the payment to The Academy and to Academy Equity investors (sic) 
must be disgorged and returned to the trust." See Addendum B at p. 7. 
On December 22, 2006, defendants filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of 
Fact and/or Judgment. Rec. at pp. 353 - 369. Plaintiffs opposed such motion and a 
hearing was held on February 20, 2007. A true and correct copy of the transcript of such 
hearing is attached hereto as Addendum C. During such hearing, the trial court denied 
the defendants' motion. However, the trial court nevertheless ordered the parties to each 
designate an expert witness and exchange expert reports by dates certain. See Addendum 
C at p. 20, line 20 - p. 21, line 18. Thereafter, a Stipulated Scheduling Order 
("Scheduling Order") was entered on April 26, 2007. Rec. at pp. 390 - 391. Each of the 
parties thereafter designated an expert witness but neither of the parties provided any 
expert reports by the dates required by the Scheduling Order. Rec. at pp. 513 - 514. 
Because the defendants failed to comply with the trial court's order of December 
12, 2006, by returning the funds at issue to the trust, the plaintiffs sought and obtained an 
Order to Show Cause against the defendants on August 17, 2007. Rec. at pp. 396 - 399, 
412 - 423. After the hearing on the Order to Show Cause, the trial court ordered that the 
funds be immediately paid to plaintiffs' counsel to be held in trust until further order of 
the trial court. Rec. at pp. 500 - 501. 
After the plaintiffs sought the Order to Show Cause, but before the matter was 
heard, the defendants filed another Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants Third 
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MSJ"). Rec. at pp. 431 - 466. The defendants' motion was supported by the affidavit of 
defendants' designated expert and sought judgment on the sole basis that the plaintiffs 
had not filed an expert report by the deadline set by the Scheduling Order. In response, 
plaintiffs filed a Motion to Strike the affidavit of defendants' expert based upon the fact 
that the defendants had also not provided an expert report by the deadline set by the 
Scheduling Order, and filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Rec. at pp. 502 -
554. On December 4,2007, the trial court entered its order striking the affidavit of 
defendants' designated expert. Rec. at pp. 585 - 586. The trial court heard argument on 
the parties' motions for summary judgment on January 8, 2008. A true and correct copy 
of the transcript of such hearing is attached hereto as Addendum D. After hearing the 
parties' arguments, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision on Motions for 
Summary Judgment on February 4, 2008. A true and correct copy of the memorandum 
decision is attached hereto as Addendum E. By its memorandum decision, the trial court 
granted Defendants' Third MSJ and dismissed the plaintiffs' case based solely upon the 
plaintiffs' failure to provide an expert report by the date set by the Scheduling Order. See 
Addendum E. This appeal followed. 
II Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The best statement of relevant facts from which to initially understand this case 
comes from the trial court's Order on Motions for Summary Judgment entered December 
12, 2006. See Addendum B. The facts, as set forth therein, are as follows: 
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1. Plaintiffs are the adult children of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr and beneficiaries 
of the Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust ("the trust"), dated December 5, 2000. Sheryl 
Farr died on October 18, 2001. 
2. Defendant Bruce Hughes was named as the successor trustee of the trust 
and acted as such upon Sheryl Farr's death. 
3. The trust document provides for payment of legal claims in these terms: 
6.1. Payment of Expenses, Claims, and Taxes. On my death, my Trustee is 
authorized, but not directed, to pay the following: 
6.1.2. Legal Claims. Legally enforceable claims against me or my 
estate. 
4. Further, under section 12.4 of trust, the trustee is required to report to the 
beneficiaries "at least semiannually ... all of the receipts, disbursements, and distributions 
occurring during the reporting period, along with a complete statement of the trust 
property." 
5. Defendant The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. ("The Academy"), is a 
Utah corporation doing business in Iron County. The Academy operated a private school 
in Cedar City. Prior to the death of Sheryl Farr, the shareholders of The Academy, each 
holding equal shares, were Sheryl Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, 
and Jody Turtle. 
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6. Defendant Academy Equity Investors, LLC ("Academy Equity Investors"'), 
was a Utah limited liability company; however, the company expired in 2005 for failure 
to renew. Academy Equity Investors was organized in order to receive contributions to 
finance the school as a whole. Prior to the death of Sheryl Fair, the shareholders of 
Academy Equity Investors, each holding equal shares, were also Sheryl Fan*, Bruce 
Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Turtle. 
7. Academy Acres, LLC ("Academy Acres") is a Utah limited liability 
company. Academy Acres owned the real estate on which The Academy operated. Prior 
to the death of Sheryl Farr, the members of Academy Acres were the same five 
individuals - Sheryl Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Turtle 
- and each held an equal interest. 
8. Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, and Thomas Fuller were the directors of 
The Academy. 
9. Exhibit A to The Academy's bylaws, adopted by the directors on January 4, 
2000, is a shareholder buy-sell agreement with the following provisions [set forth below 
in the agreement's own, somewhat Victorian, style of capitalization]: 
1.3 Transfers at Death. On the death of any Stockholder, the Stockholder's 
Personal Representative will be deemed to have offered to sell to The 
Academy all the deceased Stockholder's shares in the Company at the 
Agreement Price and on the Agreement Terms, as indicated in this section. 
1.3.1. The Academy shall have sixty (60) days from the date of the 
death of the deceased Stockholder in which to elect to buy all of the 
Offered Shares.... 
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1.7 Ownership in Academy Acres, LLC. The Shareholders contemplate the 
formation of a real estate Limited Liability Company to be named Academy 
Acres, LLC, for the purpose of owning and operating real estate and real 
property for the use and lease by The Academy. Any transfer deemed to 
have occurred under this Section shall automatically trigger a Buyout of the 
Stockholder's ownership in Academy Acres LLC... 
2.1. Annual Revisions. Each year the Stockholders shall meet and shall 
review the Agreement Price. If the Stockholders unanimously so agree, they 
shall modify the Agreement Price to reflect what they believe to be the then 
current fair market value of the Company minus all mortgages, debts, 
Stockholder loans and accrued payables of the Company. It is possible, 
from time to time, that the Agreement Price will be a negative value, which 
will represent an obligation of the transferring Stockholder or their [sic] 
estate to the company.... 
2.2. Automatic Adjustment. At the end of each fiscal year beginning after 
the date of this Agreement, if the Stockholders have not unanimously 
agreed to an adjustment in the Agreement Price for two consecutive fiscal 
years, pursuant to Section 2.1., the Agreement Price, as most recently 
adjusted, shall be valued by appraisal pursuant to Section 2.3. 
2.3. How Computed. The Agreement Price will be the fair market value of 
Offered Shares as determined by the independent certified public 
accountant ("CPA") regularly employed by The Academy or, if The 
Academy has no regularly employed independent CPA, an independent 
CPA selected by The Academy for this purpose. This valuation shall be 
determined under the same methods as would be used for determining the 
estate tax value of the Offered Shares if the Offering Stockholder had died 
on the date the offer was deemed made, ignoring any alternate valuation 
date (under Code Section 2032) or special use valuation (under Code 
Section 2032A).... 
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3.2. Negative Value Payment Due to The Academy. If the Agreed Value 
calculated or agreed to in Section 2 above, is a Negative Value, the 
terminating Stockholder or their [sic] estate will have an obligation payable 
to the Company. 
3.2.1. Due to the Death of a Stockholder. The Negative Value of the 
Scares of a deceased Stockholder shall, to the extent of the death benefit 
ainount of the life insurance policies that any Stockholder has maintained 
urider Section 4, be paid in cash or by good personal check. Any remaining 
amount of the Negative Value shall be a claim against the available assets 
of the Stockholder's estate. 
10. The initial members of Academy Acres also entered into an operating 
agreement which was effective as of August 1, 2000. This operating agreement contained 
a buy-sell agreement as its Exhibit A. Sections 1.3, 1.3.1, 2.3, 3.2, and 3.2.1 of the 
Academy Acre's buy-sell agreement correspond nearly exactly with sections 1.3, 1.3.1, 
2.3, 3.2. and 3.2-1., respectively, of The Academy's buy-sell agreement; however, 
Academy Acres' agreement substitutes "member" for "stockholder" and "interest" for 
"shares." 
11. Stockholder/member Thomas Fuller regularly provided and maintained the 
accounting books and records of The Academy and Academy Acres. Another 
stockholder/member, Thomas Hughes, is an accountant, and regularly performed and 
maintained accounting books and records for The Academy, Academy Acres, and 
Academy Equity Investors. 
12. Neither Thomas Fuller nor Thomas Hughes is "an independent CPA." 
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13. Upon the death of Sheryl Farr, Thomas Fuller calculated her share of the 
negative value of The Academy and Academy Acres. 
14. In addition, Thomas Hughes prepared an accounting of The Academy's and 
Academy Acres' assets and liabilities. He states in his affidavit that he made a valuation 
"by the same methods as would be used for determining the estate tax value of the offered 
shares if the offering shareholder had died on the date the offer was deemed made, 
ignoring any alternate valuation date ... or special use valuation," as required by the buy-
sell agreements. 
15. According to Thomas Hughes' accounting, The Academy's liabilities 
exceeded its assets by $572,716.70 and Academy Acres' liabilities exceeded its assets by 
$177,861.62. He determined that the amount of the debt chargeable to the estate of 
Sheryl Farr was $113,543.34 for The Academy and $35,572.32 for Academy Acres, a 
total of $149,115.66. 
16. Defendant Bruce Hughes transferred $6,000,00 from trust funds directly to 
The Academy in partial payment of Sheryl Fair's negative value in that entity. He also 
paid $115,000.00 of the trust's funds to Academy Equity Investors as partial payment of 
the decedent's negative value in The Academy and Academy Acros. 
17. Bruce Hughes did not provide an accounting of his actions as trustee to the 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
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18. No annual revisions were made to the agreement price as required by 
sections 2.1 of the respective buy-sell agreements; neither was any valuation of the 
agreement price made by appraisal as required by sections 2.2 of the respective buy-sell 
agreements. 
19. It is not clear whether The Academy elected to purchase the Sheryl Farr's 
shares or interest within the 60-day provision of the buy-sell agreements at 1.3.1. 
20. At the time he executed the checks to The Academy and to Academy Equity 
Investors, Bruce Hughes held a pecuniary, ownership, and substantial beneficial interest 
in those companies and thus personally benefitted from such payment. 
See Addendum B at pp. 1 - 6 
21. At the hearing on the Defendants' Second MSJ and the Plaintiffs' First 
MSJ, the trial court noted: "Okay. Well, counsel, I do agree with you there is no use 
trying this case. Would not do us any good at all to try this matter as it stands now, 
because this can't be resurrected. The failure to do the regular valuations and the failure 
to have the regular reports, we can't go back and make that happen. It would be a 
meaningless act.. . . But tell your clients not to get ready to save up a bunch of money for 
trial either because I don't think a trial is going to do us any good. I think we have the 
record we need." See Addendum A at p. 25, lines 10-25. 
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Based upon the foregoing facts as found by the trial court, and the arguments 
presented at the hearing on the matter, the trial court entered the following conclusions of 
law in its December 12, 2006 Order on Motions for Summary Judgment. 
22. "Defendant Bruce Hughes, as trustee, was therefore charged as a fiduciary 
with a strict duty of loyalty in his dealings with the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the trust." 
See Addendum B at p. 6. 
23. "Here it is undisputed that Bruce Hughes had a personal interest in those 
entities paid with trust funds." Id. 
24. "While the terms of the trust permitted him to use trust funds to pay 'legally 
enforceable claims,5 it does not authorize the trustee to pay those claims unless and until 
they are legally enforceable. Neither does it authorize him to pay an amount which may 
be greater than what is legally enforceable." Id. at pp. 6 - 7. 
25. "The buy-sell agreements do not give rise to an enforceable claim against 
the deceased member's or shareholder's estate until certain conditions are fulfilled. . . . 
The agreement price is defined as 'fair market value as determined by the independent 
certified public accountant.' (2.3) Thomas Fuller and Thomas Hughes are not certified 
public accountants, nor are they even arguably independent." Id. at p. 7. 
26. "Accordingly, the Court holds the buy-sell agreements were breached when 
trust funds were paid without a determination by an independent CPA." Id. 
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27. "Further, the failure to apprise the beneficiaries of the trust debts, to provide 
semiannual accountings, and to obtain any independent review of the amount of the debt 
properly chargeable against Ms. Farr's estate represents a breach of the trustee's duties of 
loyalty and 'utmost fidelity.'" Id. 
28. Based upon the above facts and legal conclusions, the trial court ordered: 
"1 . Because of the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty and the breach of the 
buy-sell agreements, the payment to The Academy and to Academy Equity Investors must 
be disgorged and returned to the trust. 
2. The buy-sell agreements must be followed. 
3. It remains for the parties to either litigate their obligations under the buy-
sell agreements, or settle or mediate." Id. at pp. 7 - 8. 
Additional material facts to this case are as follows: 
29. No claim was ever asserted against the plaintiffs in the trial court by The 
Academy or Academy Equity Investors. Rec. at pp. 17 - 22, 39 - 44. 
30. Academy Acres is not, and never has been, a party to this case. Rec. at pp. 
1-7, 17-22,39-44. 
31. On December 22, 2006, defendants filed a Motion to Alter or Amend 
Findings of Fact and/or Judgment. Rec. at pp. 353 - 369. During the hearing on such 
motion, the trial court, while denying the defendants' motion, nevertheless directed the 
parties to each designate an expert witness and exchange expert reports by dates certain to 
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ascertain whether the amounts claimed by the defendants were correctly calculated. See 
Addendum C at p. 20, line 20 - p. 21, line 18. 
32. Despite the fact that both the plaintiffs and defendants had designated 
expert witnesses but not produced expert reports, the trial court, on February 4, 2008, 
issued its Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary Judgment and granted 
Defendants' Third MS J and dismissed the plaintiffs' case solely for plaintiffs5 failure to 
provide an expert report. See Addendum E. 
34. No sanction was imposed against the defendants for failing to abide by the 
Scheduling Order by providing an expert report. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Based upon the fact that the trial court had rendered summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff and refused to alter or amend such judgment or its findings in relation 
thereto, the defendants were effectively precluded from raising any claim against the 
plaintiffs. This is due to the trial court's finding that the defendant companies had 
breached the buy-sell agreements and that the trustee had breached his fiduciary duties to 
the beneficiaries of the trust in both managing the trust and making the payments at issue 
in this case. These trial court findings, conclusions and judgment are the law of the case. 
Where a party breaches a contract, the nonbreaching party is excused from 
performance. Since the defendant companies breached the buy-sell agreements, Ms. 
Farr's estate was relieved from performance and thus the transfers made by the trustee 
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were not on account of legally enforceable claims as required by the trust. No expert 
testimony regarding amounts claimed due by the defendant companies could affect the 
trial court's findings and judgment in this regard. The same is true as to the trial court's 
findings, conclusions and judgment determining that the trustee had breached his 
fiduciary duties. 
If the production of an expert report by the plaintiffs could be deemed necessary 
after the court's rendering of summary judgment, such report would not be required for 
any purpose other than rebuttal, since the trial court had already invalidated the 
defendants' accounting and entered judgment for plaintiffs. Therefore, based upon all of 
the above, the plaintiff was substantially justified in not providing an expert report. 
Because the trial court's ruling issuing sanctions against the plaintiffs fails to 
explain how the plaintiffs failure to provide an expert report affected the court or the 
defendants, the trial court's ruling is insufficient. This is also true based upon the fact 
that the trial court's ruling states that the plaintiffs were not substantially justified in not 
providing the report, but fails to set forth any basis for such statement. In fact, based 
upon the prior findings, conclusions and summary judgment, the plaintiffs wrere 
substantially justified in not providing an expert report until, if at all, after receipt of the 
defendants' expert report. However, the defendants never provided an expert report 
either, although ordered to do so. Despite this fact, the trial court sanctioned the plaintiffs 
for not providing a report but rewarded the defendants even though they were as much at 
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fault as the plaintiffs for not providing an expert report. Such unequal treatment of the 
parties is an abuse of discretion and unjust. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law. 
The trial court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness, according 
its conclusions of law no deference. Summary judgment should be granted only where no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Hall v. NACM Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, \9, 988 P.2d 942, 945 -
946. The trial court's imposition of sanctions under Rules 16 and 37, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Aurora Credit Services, 
Inc. v. Liberty WestDev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, |9 , 129 P.3d 287, 289; Depew v. 
Sullivan, 2003 UT App 152, |35, 71 P.3d 601, 612. In this case, summary judgment was 
entered as a sanction against the plaintiffs and not because the trial court found that there 
were no disputed issues of material fact or that the defendants were entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Therefore, the abuse of discretion standard is most applicable to this 
case. 
In imposing sanctions under Rule 37, the trial court must make sufficient findings 
to support the imposition of sanctions and such findings must allow the appellate court to 
determine from a reading of the record "upon what legal ground the sanctions are 
imposed" and such findings must also "explain how the [actions of the party sanctioned] 
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affected either the court or [the other parties to the action]." Hall v. NACM 
Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, f22, 988 P.2d 942, 948. 
In Preston & Chambers, P.C v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260 (Utah App 1997), this court 
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim based upon the 
defendant's failure to obtain an expert witness within the time required by the trial court. 
The trial court had entered an order granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment 
unless the defendant obtained an expert to testify as to the attorney standard of care and 
alleged breach of that standard and who would be ready to be deposed within sixty days. 
This court noted: "Because dismissal of a party's action for failure to respond to a court 
order compelling discovery is a harsh sanction, 'the court must find on the part of the 
noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith, or fault, or "persistent dilatory tactics 
frustrating the judicial process.'" Id. at 263. This court found that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in ordering sanctions due to the defendant's repeated dilatory actions. 
The requirement to find willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics 
tending to frustrate the judicial process has also been noted in Aurora Credit Services, 
Inc. v. Liberty WestDev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, Tf9, 129 P.3d 287, 291, Coxey v. 
Fraternal Order of the Eagles, Aerie No. 2742, 2005 UT App 185, \A, 112 P.3d 1244, 
1246, Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, |16, 999 P.2d 588, 592, and Morton v. 
Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997). "To support a finding of 
willfulness, there need only be any intentional failure as distinguished from involuntary 
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noncompliance. No wrongful intent need be shown." Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. 
Liberty WestDev., Inc., 2006 UT App 48, f9, 129 P.3d 287, 291, Coxey v. Fraternal 
Order of the Eagles, Aerie No. 2742, 2005 UT App 185, TJ6, 112 P.3d 1244, 1246. "The 
sanction of default judgment is justified where there has been a frustration of the judicial 
process, viz., where the failure to respond to discovery impedes trial on the merits and 
makes it impossible to ascertain whether the allegations of the answer have any factual 
merit.55 W.W.&W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 
1977). 
However, notwithstanding the discretion granted to a trial court in determining the 
imposition of sanctions: "The extreme sanction of default or dismissal must be tempered 
by the careful exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is merited.55 Id. 
In Carman v. Slovens, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976), the trial court had stricken a 
defendant's answer and entered his default based upon the defendant's failure to appear at 
his deposition or produce documents at such deposition. In reversing the trial court's 
sanction, the Utah Supreme Court noted 
It is true that where the authority to perform a proposed action rests within 
the discretion of the court we must allow considerable latitude in which he 
may exercise his judgment. But this does not mean that the court has 
unrestrained power to act in an arbitrary manner. Fundamental to the 
concept of the rule of law is the principle that reason and justice shall 
prevail over the arbitrary and uncontrolled will of any one person; and that 
applies to all men in every status: to courts and judges, as well as autocrats 
and bureaucrats. The meaning of the term "discretion" itself imports that 
the action should be taken within reason and good conscience in the interest 
of protecting the rights of both parties and serving the ends of justice. It has 
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always been the policy of our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting 
parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy. 
Id. at 603 (footnotes omitted). 
II. The Procedural Setting of this Case in the Trial Court at the Time the 
Court Entered Sanctions Against the Plaintiffs is Essential to a 
Determination of Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion. 
The determination by this court of the question of whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in sanctioning the plaintiffs as it did requires a review of all of the pertinent 
procedural aspects of this case. In that regard., the circumstances existing at the time the 
sanctions were entered by the trial court include: (a) the trial court had entered findings of 
fact and conclusions of law that: (i) the buy-sell agreements had been breached by the 
defendants; and (ii) the trustee had violated his duties of loyalty and utmost fidelity by 
failing to apprise the beneficiaries of the trust debts, failing to provide semiannual 
accountings, and failing to obtain any independent review of the amount of the debt 
properly chargeable against Ms. Farr's estate; (b) the trial court had granted the plaintiffs 
summary judgment under the Plaintiffs' First MS J and ordered that, based upon the 
trustee's breach of fiduciary duties and the breach of the buy-sell agreements, the 
payments to the Academy and Academy Equity Investors had to be returned to the trust; 
and (c) the trial court had advised the parties that there was no use trying the case because 
the defendants' breach of the buy-sell agreements by failing to properly calculate the 
agreement price for Ms. Fair's interests in the companies "could not be resurrected" and 
with "the failure to do the regular valuations and the failure to have the regular reports, 
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we can't go back and make that happen. It would be a meaningless act." See Addendum 
A at p. 25, lines 10 - 16. Additionally, although claims were made by the defendants that 
Academy Acres was owed money, Academy Acres has never been a party to this action, 
Academy Equity Investors was a defunct company and not registered with the State of 
Utah and no counterclaim or other claim had ever been asserted in this action by either of 
the business entities named as defendants. 
III. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Granting Summary Judgment 
to the Defendants and Dismissing the Plaintiffs' Case. 
Under all of the circumstances of this case, the trial court's order imposing 
sanctions against the plaintiffs, granting the defendants summary judgment and 
dismissing the plaintiffs' case, was an abuse of discretion since (a) the case had already 
been decided in favor of the plaintiffs; (b) the expert reports at issue were neither required 
under the rules nor needed for plaintiffs to further prosecute this case; (c) the trial court 
failed to enter findings as to why the plaintiffs' failure to provide the reports was not 
substantially justified or what effect such failure had on the court or the other parties; (d) 
the plaintiffs' failure to provide such reports was substantially justified; and (e) the 
defendants also failed to adhere to the trial court's order to provide expert reports. 
A. The plaintiffs were awarded summary judgment on all material 
claims and such judgment precluded all recovery by the 
defendants notwithstanding any expert reports or testimony. 
The petition filed by the plaintiffs in this case included one cause of action against 
the defendant companies to void the payments of $6,000.00 and $115,000.00 made by the 
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trustee and to have such sums restored to the trust beneficiaries. All other claims were 
against Bruce Hughes in his capacity as trustee and sought to void the transfers of funds, 
require an accounting by the trustee, require the trustee to make restitution of all sums and 
assets wrongfully transferred, and award the plaintiffs punitive damages as against the 
trustee. Rec. at pp. 1-7. By its December 12, 2006 Order on Motions for Summary 
Judgment, the trial court found that the defendant companies had breached the buy-sell 
agreements and that the trustee had breached his fiduciary duties. Each of these findings 
provides an independent basis for restoring the transferred funds to the trust beneficiaries. 
The trial court's findings, conclusions and order of summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs under the December 12, 2006 Order constitute law of the case. "Simply 
stated, under the law of the case doctrine, 'a decision made on an issue during one stage 
of a case is binding in successive stages of the same litigation.'55 IHC Health Services, 
Inc. v.D& KManagement, Inc., 2008 UT 36, ^26, 606 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (footnote 
omitted). While the trial court retained the option of revisiting the decided issues prior to 
final judgment or appeal, the trial court failed to do so. In fact, in denying the defendants5 
Motion to Alter or Amend Findings of Fact and/or Judgment, the trial court specifically 
refused to do so. Based thereon, the December 12, 2006 findings, conclusions and 
summary judgment constitute law of the case. 
Because of the December 12, 2006 Order, the defendant companies were wholly 
precluded from claiming that they had any right to retain the funds at issue or that the 
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estate owed such companies any amount, regardless of what expert testimony might show 
as to the agreement price for the interests of Ms. Fan. "The law is well settled that a 
material breach by one party to a contract excuses further performance by the 
nonbreaching party (citations omitted). Also, a party seeking to enforce a contract must 
prove performance of its own obligations under the contract." Holbrook v. Master 
Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994). Since the trial court ruled that the 
defendant companies had breached the buy-sell agreements, the companies had no claim 
against Ms. Farr's estate and could not claim a right to keep the funds which had been 
transferred to such companies by the trustee. The breach by the companies could not be 
cured since under the buy-sell agreements, upon the death of a member/shareholder, the 
companies had only sixty (60) days from the date of the death of the deceased 
member/shareholder in which to elect to buy the offered interest. Thus, for the companies 
to comply with the terms of the buy-sell agreements in attempting to purchase Ms. Farr's 
interest, the companies had to fulfill their obligations under the buy-sell agreements 
within sixty days of Ms. Farr's death. This did not happen. 
Additionally, since the trial court had found that the trustee had breached his 
fiduciary duties, the trial court ruled that the trust was entitled to reimbursement of the 
funds previously transferred by the trustee. Any expert testimony provided regarding 
whether amounts claimed due by the defendant companies were or were not calculated 
correctly would in no way cure the trustee's "failure to apprise the beneficiaries of the 
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trust debts,. . provide semiannual accountings, [or] obtain any independent review of the 
amount of the debt properly chargeable against Ms. Farr's estate." Addendum B at p. 7. 
Thus, in light of the trial court's December 12, 2006 Order, expert testimony was 
unnecessary and the failure to provide expert reports had no effect upon the court or the 
claims of the defendants. 
B. Any expert report on behalf of the plaintiffs was not required to 
be provided, if at all, until after the defendants provided their 
report. 
The Scheduling Order relating to experts, which the trial court relied upon in 
sanctioning the plaintiffs, specifically states: "Plaintiffs shall provide to defendants the 
required expert report no later than June 15, 2007." Rec. at pp 390 - 391. Under Rule 
26(a)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reports are required to be provided for any 
expert who may be used at trial to present evidence. However, where the expert is only to 
be used to contradict or rebut the other party's expert, such report need not be made until 
after receipt of the other party's expert report. Since the plaintiffs had already received a 
ruling in their favor requiring restitution of the funds, the only thing they would need to 
be prepared to do at trial, if anything, is rebut any expert testimony trying to establish that 
the calculation of the agreement price for Ms. Farr's interests in the companies was 
properly calculated under the buy-sell agreements. Thus, no expert report could be 
prepared, and plaintiffs would have no obligation to do so, until after receipt of the 
defendants' report. 
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C. The trial court's findings are insufficient and do not support the 
entry of sanctions against the plaintiffs. 
As set forth in Hall v. NACMInterrnountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, 988 P.2d 942, 
when the trial court imposes sanctions under Rule 37, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
trial court must make sufficient findings to support the imposition of sanctions and such 
findings must be sufficient to allow the appellate court to determine from a reading of the 
record "upon what legal ground the sanctions are imposed" and such findings must also 
"explain how the [actions of the party sanctioned] affected either the court or [the other 
parties to the action]." Id. at ^22. The trial court's memorandum decision imposing the 
sanctions does clearly indicate that the sanctions are being imposed pursuant to Rules 
16(d) and 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the court simply makes the 
statement, without elaboration, that "The Court does not find that the failure to adhere to 
the established deadlines was substantially justified" and nowhere does the trial court 
explain how the plaintiffs5 failure to provide the expert reports affected the court or the 
defendants. See Addendum E. In light of the summary judgment previously granted in 
favor of the plaintiffs, as explained above, there could be no detrimental affect on the 
court or the defendants resulting from the plaintiffs' failure to provide an expert report. 
D. The plaintiffs9 failure to provide an expert report was 
substantially justified. 
Under Rule 16, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: "If a party . . . fails to obey a 
scheduling or pretrial order,... the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may make 
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such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others, any of the orders provided 
in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D)." Rule 37(b)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
"If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 16(b) . . . unless the court finds that 
the failure was substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take 
such action in regard to the failure as are just." 
All of the reasons set forth under the preceding arguments establish a justification 
for the plaintiffs not providing an expert report. Expert testimony regarding what the 
assets and liabilities of the companies were on the date of Ms. Farr's death or whether the 
assets and liabilities of the companies had been previously calculated in accordance with 
the buy-sell agreements would make no difference. The fact that the assets and liabilities 
had not been calculated according to the buy-sell agreements in the first place was the 
issue before the trial court and the trial court resolved that issue in favor of the plaintiffs. 
No recalculation of the assets or liabilities, nor any opinion of whether the numbers in the 
previous calculation were correct, would save the defendant companies from their breach 
of the buy-sell agreements or the trustee from his breach of fiduciary duties. The 
plaintiffs were substantially justified in relying on the trial court's December 12, 2006 
Order and the judgment granted therein, in determining that they would need to provide 
an expert report only for rebuttal purposes after they received the defendants' expert 
report, if at all. 
27 
E. The trial court erred when it sanctioned the plaintiffs for not 
providing an expert report and granted the defendants summary 
judgment while dismissing the plaintiffs' case, when the 
defendants were equally in default of the trial court's order that 
the parties provide expert reports. 
The Scheduling Order which required expert reports to be provided states: 
1. Plaintiffs shall designate an expert witness by April 30, 2007. 
2. Defendants shall designate an expert witness, if any, by May 15, 
2007. 
3. Plaintiffs shall provide to defendants the required expert report no 
later than June 15, 2007. 
4. Defendants shall provide to plaintiffs the required expert report no 
later than July 13, 2007. 
Both the plaintiffs and defendants designated an expert witness. The language requiring 
the parties to provide expert reports is identical as to both plaintiffs and defendants. While 
the plaintiffs did not provide an expert report, neither did the defendants. Therefore, 
defendants were equally in default of the Scheduling Order requirements. Yet the trial 
court rewarded rather than sanctioned defendants. Both Rules 16 and 37 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure allow the court to enter sanctions "as are just." Under the 
circumstances of this case, and especially considering the defendants' own failure to 
provide an expert report as ordered by the court, the action of the trial court in sanctioning 
the plaintiff while rewarding the defendant for the same failure is an abuse of discretion 
and certainly is unjust. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiffs respectfully request that this court reverse 
the trial court's imposition of sanctions, reverse the trial court's grant of the Defendants' 
Third MS J, and reverse the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' case. Further, based 
upon the trial court's December 12, 2006 Order granting plaintiff summary judgment, the 
plaintiffs request that this court direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs and against the defendants in the sum of $121,000.00, with interest thereon at 
the rate and for the period to be determined by the trial court after hearing, and direct the 
trial court to consider and rule upon the issue of awarding attorney fees to the plaintiffs as 
part of the judgment to be entered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of September, 2008. 
GatyOfKuhlma 
AtJ*5>rney for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on September 19, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed First Class mail, postage prepaid to Brian L. Olson, counsel for 
Defendants and Appellees, at 965 East 700 South, Suite 305J8t George Utah 84790. 
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PROCEEDINGS 
3 THE COURT: Let me go, then, to the matter that we 
4 are going to spend some time on. And that's a motion for 
5 summary judgment in Farr vs. Hughes and Academy at Cedar 
6 J Mountain, et al. Mr. Kuhlmann is here on behalf of 
plaintiffs, Mr. Olson on behalf of the defendants. 
Counsel, we have cross-motions for summary judgment 
based upon, basically, the affidavits, the depositions and 
10 the documents in the file. And I do appreciate your courtesy 
11 copies, because I spent some quality time during last night's 
12 late hours looking at those. As I see it, the dispute arises 
13 out of an accounting concern with the death of Mrs. Farr and 
14 the contributions to these defendant entities from her estate 
15 based upon the articles and the stock purchase agreements 
16 that were organic to the formation of these entities. Have I 
17 got correct, Mr. Olson? 
18 MR. OLSON: That's correct, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: And the dispute from Chad, Alec and Seth 
20 Farr, who are heirs of Mrs. Farr, is that her estate's been 
21 raided pursuant to the stock purchase agreements. And the 
22 trust, corpus of the trust that she would have otherwise have 
23 had for the benefit of Chad, Alec and Seth has been depleted. 
24 And that's really what your position as plaintiffs is. Have 
25 I got that right, counsel? 
1 MR. KUHLMANN: Correct, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Gentlemen, much as I hate to say it, I 
3 can see this case being a nightmare to try because of the 
4 accounting issues in it. But, Mr. Olson, my foremost concern 
5 I is the fact that the documents that we are dealing with 
6 require the, and I will put it in quotes because everybody 
7 did this in your pleadings, "independent CPAM have 
8 fingerprints on these evaluations -- not evaluations, but 
9 valuations. And while Mr. Hughes — and its Bruce Hughes who 
10 is the accountant; is that right, counsel? 
11 MR. KUHLMANN: Actually, Bruce Hughes, Tom Hughes and 
12 Tom are all accountats. 
13 THE COURT: Tom Fuller. Okay. They are all 
14 accountants. But none of them are CPAs; is that correct? 
15 MR. KUHLMANN: I think Bruce Hughes — well, I would 
16 have to double check. I don't recall. 
17 THE COURT: And because of their interests in the 
18 corporate entities, the business entities, I!ll put it, 
19 because of their interests, how can I make them independent? 
20 Is there any way that I can look at this language and find 
21 independent there when they seem to have at least, as Mr. 
22 Kuhlmannfs clients see, a vested interest in the preservation 
23 of the assets of these two entities? 
24 MR. OLSON: Sure. I think I can address that in a 
25 couple of fashions, Your Honor. First of all, and for what 
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1 it's worth to the court, my first year out of law school 
2 experience was with Dwight & Tusch [phonetic]. I have an 
3 accounting background. I went to work in public accounting 
4 right out of law school. I have a feel for accountants and 
5 the terms they use. The term "independent certified public 
6 accountant" is a phrase used in the accounting world in which 
7 J often "independent" doesn't really mean independent. The 
reality is that certified public accountants mainly came into 
9 I existence for auditing books of large corporations that are 
10 publicly traded. They have to have the signature on their 
11 books and reports by a certified independent public 
12 accountant. 
13 THE COURT: Well, the theory, really, is going back 
14 to the idea that there is objective oversight. 
15 MR. OLSON: Right. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. 
17 MR. OLSON: And the reality is that that company's 
18 accountant is much their guy as their lawyer is. It's also 
19 the same firm that's giving them tax advice. It's also the 
20 same firm that's giving them management advice. The term 
21 "independent," at least, my clients are going to see it as 
22 accountants are, is not an in-house guy. Now, for whatever 
13 that's worth, the using the Fuller firm at the time provided 
?4 accounting services. They did all of the accounting services 
15 \ for these entities. I believe the records show actually 
1 billed for their accounting services for these entities. But 
2 I think that the easier way to deal with this problem -- and 
3 I understand where the court's coming from, that, hey, we are 
4 supposed to have an accounting by an independent CPA. An 
5 easier way to deal with this is the accounting that's been 
6 provided is an undisputed fact. Depositions were taken. Mr. 
7 Hughes', Tom Hughes who did the accounting that was 
presented, his deposition was taken. The accounting was 
there. I placed this accounting in my statement of 
undisputed facts. There is no testimony that that accounting 
is inaccurate. In fact, the testimony of Chad Farr is he 
doesn't have any reason to believe the accounting is 
inaccurate. So, as it stands right now, it's an undisputed 
fact. 
The opposing summary judgment has not disputed the 
accounting. So, regardless of whether the documents called 
for independent certified public accountant, regardless of 
whether it was Tom Hughes that did that accounting --
THE COURT: You take the position that nobody's found 
anything wrong with it. And if nobody's found anything wrong 
with it, taking it down the street to Rod Savage, my 
accountant, not going to make a difference in what the facts 
are in terms of the accounting? 
MR. OLSON: Not only is it not going to make a 
difference, but let's say we don't do summary judgment today 
6 
1 and we take this case to trial, our discovery deadlines are 
2 long since past. There is no other accountant that's going 
3 to come on and testify that these are the right figures. 
4 They are established. The plaintiffs have not hired their 
5 own expert to go in and look at these figures. They are 
6 established. They are undisputed. You know, whether another 
7 CPA at this juncture would look at it and say otherwise, they 
8 are an undisputed fact. In fact, if you look at my motion 
9 for summary judgment and in the statement of undisputed 
10 facts, the only fact that's been disputed was whether one of 
11 the entities is a Utah LLC or not. 
12 THE COURT: And that's just because it expired in 
13 2005. 
14 MR. OLSON: Right. 
15 THE COURT: Which is prior to these events taking 
16 place. 
17 MR. OLSON: And it's immaterial to this motion. So, 
18 all of those facts are established because they have not been 
19 controverted. So, the accounting is established fact for 
20 1 purposes of this proceeding. 
21 THE COURT: All right. And if the accounting is an 
12 1 established fact, the agreements, the court can rule upon as 
13 \ a matter of law, and that's really what your motion thrust 
>4 is? 
>5 MR. OLSON: Exactly, Your Honor. And, essentially, 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
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the basis of this lawsuit is going back to try a section of 
the probate code that talks about trustees' self-dealing. 
And the former 75-7-404 which, essentially, says that a 
trustee has to have permission from the court, express in the 
trust, or permission of the beneficiaries to deal in any 
transaction which he has a conflict of interest. 
THE COURT: Your argument is that your authority is 
expressed in the trust, and that that provision went by the 
by in 2004 anyway. And you don't think the statute that 
changed that provision had anything to do with the 
substantive rights of these plaintiffs? 
MR. OLSON: Well, and I think we can argue this 
regardless of statute change. You know, frankly, I think Mr. 
14 Kuhlmann did a good job of arguing the opposite of that --
the former statute probably applies. But the former statute 
says that there is an exclusion for transactions that are 
expressly authorized by the trust. What we have here is an 
undisputed fact that a debt of the estate was created by 
these buy/sell agreements. We have an undisputed fact that 
the (inaudible) trust said pay the legitimate debts of my 
estate. We have undisputed fact that those were in fact 
legitimate debts of the estate. So, the exclusion applies, 
assuming that the statute, as it applied back then applies 
right now. And I think it's a fair argument that it does. 
(Inaudible) applies. 
1 THE COURT: In order to apply the statute, I have to 
2 look at the buy/sell agreements as well as the estate 
3 documents. And, counsel, clarify my memory, because this is 
4 a trust, not an estate? 
5 MR. OLSON: That is correct, Your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. But the residue of Mrs. Farr's 
7 property was handled within the trust document. So, if I 
8 look at the trust document together with the buy/sell 
9 agreements, the trust document provided that the buy/sell 
10 agreements be satisfied. Those are legitimate bills of her 
11 property. And that's what happened. 
12 MR. OLSON: Yes. Essentially, the buy/sell documents 
13 create this debt as a debt of the estate. That she agreed to 
14 that before she died. The trust documents says pay the 
15 legitimate debts of my estate. So, those two documents 
16 combined, we have a legitimate debt of the estate. And we 
17 have a trust that says pay it. 
18 THE COURT: And the estate is still in the red 
19 because those debts have not been satisfied. 
20 MR. OLSON: Correct. 
21 THE COURT: By about what? $35,000 or something like 
22 that? 
23 MR. OLSON: I don't have the figure, but it seems 
24 like it's in that ballpark. 
25 THE COURT: All right. I think I've got your 
1 argument pretty well in mind. Again, it's one of the great 
2 benefits of me getting the courtesy copies ahead of time, 
3 because I carry them around with me and get my fingerprints 
4 all over them. 
5 Mr. Kuhlmann, from your standpoint, you think this 
6 language is way to broad in terms of the authority to pay the 
7 J legal obligations of the estate, or the trust, and that this 
is a self-dealing situation, and that these entities, Tom and 
9 I Bruce Hughes are too close to it for the court to grant 
10 summary judgment. But let's look at your side of the summary 
11 judgment. Your motion for summary judgment takes me where, 
12 Mr. Kuhlmann? I want to make sure I'm focused on that. 
13 MR. KUHLMANN: Your Honor, there is one basic fact 
14 here that I think is being hidden. And they have done a 
15 pretty good job of it. But there are three companies here. 
16 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
17 MR. KUHLMANN: Not two. Three. One is Academy 
18 Acres. And Academy Acres had a buy/sell agreement. One is a 
19 Academy at Cedar Mountain. And Academy at Cedar Mountain had 
20 a buy/sell agreement. 
21 THE COURT: Academy Equity did not. 
22 MR. KUHLMANN: Academy Equity Investors did not have. 
23 It's an entity, a (inaudible) .Legal entity. And Bruce Hughes 
24 testified (inaudible) involved in too many corporations to 
25 think about. But Academy Equity Investors had no buy/sell 
1 agreement. 
2 THE COURT: How much money did it get? 
3 MR. KUHLMANN: Academy Equity Investors took 100 — 
4 THE COURT: The lion's share then? 
5 MR. KUHLMANN: Yeah. It took $112,000. The payment 
6 went to Academy Equity Investors who was not owed one dime by 
7 J Cheryl Farr, nor her trust, nor her estate. 
THE COURT: Was there any assignment between the 
entities that had the buy/sell relationship with Miss Farr 
10 and Academy Equity? Anything like that you have come up with 
11 at all? 
12 MR. KUHLMANN: There has been no documents provided. 
13 We have asked for all corporate documents and all LLC 
14 documents. We got, frankly, very few on the issue as why the 
15 accounting -- I dispute the accounting is not being disputed. 
16 Accounting is being disputed in whole just because they 
17 didn't follow their own process. But the documents that were 
18 provided to us show nothing on assignment, show very little 
19 upon the debts that are claimed on the accounting. It's our 
20 position that --
21 THE COURT: An independent CPA would look at this and 
22 say, I can't see any debt here at all? That's your position? 
23 MR. KUHLMANN: It is. And/or, at least, substantiate 
24 it. And, as far as Academy Equity Investors, it's our 
25 position that they can't even be represented at this 
11 
1| juncture. It's undisputed that they are an invalid Utah LLC. 
2 | And, as the court is aware, if you are not registered in the 
3| state of Utah, you --
THE COURT: You don't come into court. 
5 | MR. KUHLMANN: So, as to Academy Equity Investors who 
6| received the lion's share of the funds, we are entitled to 
7 | judgment because it's undisputed that there was no buy/sell 
agreement. There is absolutely no debt due to Academy Equity 
Investors. And they are not allowed to appear in this court 
today. What the defendants have tried to do, have said, 
well, they are all (inaudible) lay companies, so they kind of 
go together. That's fine if they are separate legal entities 
with separate legal obligations and separate assets. 
THE COURT: And your determination is if we are going 
to have to try this case --
MR. KUHLMANN: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: -- your position is if we had to try this 
case, that separate entity would show up immediately. You 
would walk in with the articles and the organic documents to 
Academy Equity and show the court that they are separate and 
apart from the Acres and the Academy at Cedar Mountain, 
different entity, show the canceled check that says that they 
got the money. They are now a dissolved entity. You have a 
judgment that you are going to have to go in and take and 
probably file an action or amend this action to do a winding 
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1 up of the affairs and try to chase down that money and get it 
2 back. 
3 MR. KUHLMANN: Well, we know where the money went. 
4 Because in the depositions the parties testified, defendants 
5 testified the money went to Academy at Cedar Mountain. 
6 That's where the money went. It was payable to Academy 
7 I Equity Investors. 
THE COURT: So, what you would do is take your 
9 I judgment and garnish Academy at Cedar Mountain? 
10 MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly. 
11 THE COURT: Try to attach those assets. 
12 MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly. Because they received the 
13 funds. And they were not entitled to it. 
14 THE COURT: And your motion to summary judgment says 
15 I'm entitled to that judgment. 
16 MR. KUHLMANN: We are entitled to that judgment. 
17 THE COURT: What about the other payment that did go 
18 under the buy/sell agreement? Do you have a strong agreement 
19 or as strong an argument there based upon the independent CPA 
20 claim and the statute as well? Is that where you are relying 
21 on more there? 
22 MR. KUHLMANN: I think we have it under three things. 
23 The statute, the independent CPA claim, and the fact that the 
24 buy/sell agreement and the operating documents are nothing 
25 more than contract (inaudible). They are bound to comply 
II with those. If they don't comply with them, they can't now 
2 yell foul, we are entitled to this money. And they didn't 
3 J comply in many respects. For example, the documents require 
that there be an annual statement done that shows the assets 
5I and values of the assets and shows the liability. And the 
6 parties have to, under the documents, unanimously agree on 
7 J the valuation. If it goes two years without a unanimous 
agreement on the valuation, then it has to have an appraisal. 
Those were never done. The parties admitted, we put in our 
10 I (inaudible). Those weren't done. They weren't done on an 
11 annual basis. There was never an appraisal done. It just 
12 didn't happen. 
13 THE COURT: So, the foundation for these claims is 
14 nonexistent? 
15 MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly. Because they didn't comply 
16 with their own documents. The other part of the document 
17 says that if there's a liability, if there is a negative 
18 value, it becomes a debt of the estate; not the trust, but of 
19 the estate. There was no value in this. The estate had zero 
20 assets. 
21 Now, you asked the question about CPA. Bruce Hughes 
22 is a CPA, according to his affidavit. Tom Fuller is not, In 
23 fact, he doesn't even say he's an accountant. Tom Hughes 
24 says he's an accountant. Tom Hughes is the one who did the 
25 accounting. We think that's a problem because he's not a CPA 
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1 and because he's not independent. In fact, if you look at 
2 I the accounting, it shows that he's owed money. And he's put 
3 in there $27,000 based on monies he claims to have paid 
4 personally and shareholder backpay, which he says was part 
5 his backpay. 
6 THE COURT: So, it ratifies the lack of independent. 
7 J MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly. And there is a difference 
between being employed by the firm and doing accounting for 
9 I them, or being employed by an independent company to do 
10 accounting for an independent firm. And being an owner in a 
11 company that's claiming interest and --
12 THE COURT: Doing the accounting. 
13 MR. KUHLMANN: -- doing the accounting. The other 
14 issue we brought up in the accounting, Your Honor, is the 
15 accounting shows, as far as it being undisputed, accounting 
16 shows that there is a liability to Cheryl Farr of 11,000 
17 bucks. Cheryl Farr has to pay back part of what she's owed. 
18 It makes no sense. And there are other holes in the 
19 accounting too that have been brought out. The valuation of 
20 the property is a big issue. The property is now gone. They 
21 sold it. 
22 THE COURT: Is there a cash flow coming from that 
23 sale or has it closed? 
24 MR. KUHLMANN: I don't know, because we have received 
25 1 none of those documents. So, I can't tell you. But they did 
1 testify it sold for over a million dollars; whereas, in the 
2 accounting it shows a $495,000 value. There are holes in the 
3 accounting. The independent issue is a big one because 
4 that's kind of the basis of this whole case. None of this 
5 has been independent. None of it. 
6 Now, the argument is, well, if the trust says that we 
7 I can pay the debts of the estates. So, we take the money out, 
legitimate and legal debts of the estate. First of all, there 
is no legitimate legal debt (inaudible) . Second of all, that 
doesn't take them out of the statute. And they still have to 
comply with the statute. And, thirdly, the statute says it has 
to specifically authorize the payment. Doesn't just say 
authorize the payment, but specifically. Specifically is, you 
know, it's not defined in the code. I have looked for it. 
And, but if you look in the dictionary, the normal median says 
to name explicitly, explicitly more in detail. That's what it 
means to specify something. All it says is pay the legitimate 
debts of the estate. That's not a specific designation, which, 
especially in this case, where you are paying the same people 
that are administering the trust. 
THE COURT: Counsel, if I granted your motion for 
summary judgment, wouldn't we still have to try the issue as 
to whether or not this is a legitimate debt of the estate? 
Apart from the Academy Equity, the one that was paid to the 
entities that had the buy/sell? 
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1 MR. KUHLMANN: I don't know that you would, Your 
2j Honor. If the court were to rule that based upon their own 
3 failure to comply with their agreement in determining the 
4 amounts due and in doing annual statements and all of the 
5 things that they created in detail in their agreement, their 
6 failure to comply with --
7 J THE COURT: So, I can unwind that as well? 
MR. KUHLMANN: They didn't comply with the contract. 
9 I You can say because you didn't comply with the contract it's 
10 not a legitimate debt of the company. 
11 THE COURT: All right. 
12 MR. KUHLMANN: They are a breach of contract. 
13 THE COURT: So, basically, I could order that Academy 
14 Equity, as well as the other entities that received the money 
15 from the trust, disgorge those funds? 
16 MR. KUHLMANN: I believe so, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Put them back in the trust. And then we 
18 could at least at that point make the decision -- we don't 
19 have to make any decision. We would refund the trust. The 
20 trust would then have assets in it that would pass apart from 
21 the buy/sell agreements that you say are invalidated? 
22 MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly. The third issue here that's 
23 been brought up is there have been a claim of consent, that 
24 there was consent given. So, that even if under the old 
25 statute --
1 THE COURT: I looked at that issue, counsel. And it 
2 appeared to be at least a justiciable issue of fact there. 
3 MR. KUHLMANN: I mean, you have one side that says 
4 yes you didi give (inaudible), the other side says no he 
5 didn't. (inaudible) says, No, I didn't. And the other issue 
6 is the statute requires that (inaudible) all beneficiaries, 
7 I not from one. There is a claim that, well, he was 
representing the others in some capacity. 
THE COURT: There is no power found in discovery at 
all that he would have, 
MR. KUHLMANN: And none was ever given. (Inaudible) 
and what happens, the money went back to pay debts of the 
corporate entities Academy Acres and Academy at Cedar 
Mountain. And whether that money went specifically to Bruce 
Hughes, Tom Fuller or Tom Hughes, I don't know. We haven't 
seen those documents, haven't been produced through 
discovery. And so, I'm assuming that none of that is 
(inaudible) . So, if they paid corporate entity debt upon 
sale that might have went to those three individuals. We 
think it's pretty clear, Your Honor, that at best their 
argument is (inaudible). And if that's what you find, then 
maybe Chad Farr's interest doesn't get recouped. But, again, 
that's a disputed issue of fact. 
THE COURT: But if I take the legal position that you 
authorize -- that your argument to the court, counsel, Mr. 
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Farr's consent is meaningless because the terms of the 
documents themselves were never met and he couldn't consent 
3I to something that was not lawfully done. What was done 
4 because of the failure to do the regular statements, the 
5 failure to do the valuations on a regular basis, created all 
6 of this stuff, it's all ultra various to these corporations? 
7 MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you think you need 
to clarify for me? 
10 1 MR. KUHLMANN: I think we've touched all the issues, 
11 I Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Olson, let me give you a 
13 chance to respond to that. Tell me about the Academy Equity 
14 receiving the check. 
15 MR. OLSON: You bet, Your Honor. It's true we have 
16 three different entities here. The testimony in depositions 
17 was that Academy Equity Investors was formed and was kind of 
18 a financial contribution arm of this interrelated group. 
19 Essentially, they ran the Academy at Cedar Mountain, which 
20 was a private school for teens or residential, (inaudible) 
21 residential treatment center. But they are a private school. 
22 And that's the only business that was being run. All of the 
23 entities had all of the same shareholders, all of the same 
24 percentages. Nothing different there. It's true that the 
25 money was paid. For one reason or another, that there is not 
1 a lot of explanation. The check was written out to Academy 
2 Equity Investors. We don't deny that. But what we do have 
3 as an undisputed fact is that that amount did satisfy the 
4 debt to the Academy at Cedar Mountain. So, the question 
5 becomes here, okay, so, if we have to disgorge the money from 
6 Academy Equity Investors back to the trust, the trust just 
7 has to turn around and pay the legitimate debts of the estate 
8 which includes this debt to the Academy at Cedar Mountain. 
9 So, it's just circular. 
10 THE COURT: What about the claim that the valuations 
11 and the regular organic reviews of the circumstances, these 
12 companies, there should have been reports prepared on a 
13 regular basis? What about the claim that because that wasn't 
14 done it's all annulity? 
15 MR. OLSON: Well, it's not all annulity. My 
16 recollection of the documents are at the annual meeting there 
17 was going to be an established value. And that's kind of a 
18 common procedure for buy/sell agreements. Also, what is very 
19 common with small closely held entities, they don't actually 
20 do them. I think that's what happened here. But my 
21 recollection of the document is that it says if it doesn't 
22 happen there will be a valuation. Well, it doesn't mean that 
23 the debt's not there. It just means that there has to be a 
24 valuation back when. 
25 THE COURT: But who does the valuation? 
20 
1 I MR. OLSON: I agree that it would have to be an 
2 1 independent CPA under those documents. But the problem we 
3 have here, Your Honor, is we have undisputed facts. Okay? 
4 None of this has been disputed by the other side. They only 
5 disputed one fact in my entire statement of undisputed facts. 
6 It has nothing to do with this. I said this is the 
7 accounting. This is what's owed in the undisputed facts. 
8 And they said we don't dispute that. So, the problem we are 
9 dealing with here, Your Honor, is even if we go to trial you 
10 are not going to have anything more than what you have right 
111 now to make your decision. Discovery's done. We are not 
12 going back with independent CPA's and doing valuation. We 
13 are not getting business valuation experts involved to 
14 valuate what was the business worth way back when. What you 
15 have is undisputed facts, this is the accounting. That it 
16 was done under the method that was appropriate for 
17 determining what the negative value was. That has not been 
18 disputed. That's the fact that you have. If they want to 
19 dispute that fact, they have to provide some testimony or 
20 evidence that there is a dispute. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Olson, it doesn't appear to me as 
22 though Mr. Kuhlmann is disputing your facts at all. The 
23 records supports everything you are telling me. It appears 
24 to me as though Mr. Kuhlmann's position and his client's 
25 position is that the agreements, the documents cry against 
21 
1 these two checks having been paid because none of the other 
2 things that these documents and agreements demanded being 
3 done were done. So, as a matter of law, under this set of 
4 facts, these funds have to be disgorged back to the trust and 
5 then these entities have got a real uphill fight trying to 
6 prove, if they can at all, and they may not be able to at 
7 J this point at this time because of the failure to get the 
independent valuation, the independent use. That's what I 
9 1 see Mr. KuhlmannTs argument. It's not really based around 
10 the facts at all but, simply, the fact that the law of these 
11 documents would force the result that he's asking. 
12 MR. OLSON: Well, here's the flaw in that argument, 
13 Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. 
15 MR. OLSON: The accounting's not that complicated. 
16 The account was essentially an accounting of assets versus 
17 liabilities. We have books and records from the inception of 
18 these entities. It's not that complicated to go back and say 
19 assets versus liabilities kicks out either a positive figure 
20 or a negative figure. And you divide it by four partners. 
21 It's not that complicated. The entities will be able to go 
22 back and do that. An independant accountant will be able to 
23 go back and do that. That being the case, I mean, certainly, 
24 the heirs of Cheryl Farr are not entitled to a windfall to 
25 the detriment of her legitimate creditors. That's not what 
22 
1 we are suggesting here. I can't imagine they would even 
2 suggest that if these are legitimate business debts 
3 established by Cheryl Farr before she died agreed to it, are 
4 we going to say that because this valuation wasn't done on 
5 such and such a dates that the kids are entitled to a 
6 windfall and her business partners who contracted with her 
7 J are just out in the cold? It doesn't make any sense. 
THE COURT: Counsel, if her business partners who 
9 J contracted with her breached the contracts by having failed 
10 to perform those key elements of the contracts which were 
11 regular valuations, that's a consequence of their breach, 
12 isn't it? I see that's what Mr. Kuhlmann is getting to. 
13 Probably much more artfully than I just put it. But I see 
14 that's what his argument is. But your position is these 
15 documents created contracts. The contracts had been complied 
16 with in the very bottom line; that is, this is what the value 
17 is. This is what the debt is. And the satisfaction of that 
18 debt has happened and we are done. 
19 MR. OLSON: Well, that's really my position. I guess 
20 what Your Honor has to sit back and ask yourself is -- let's 
21 assume we go to trial on this issue. You know, what more 
22 could we put in front of Your Honor to make a decision in 
23 this case? 
24 THE COURT: I think you are right. 
25 MR. OLSON: There is nothing we could put in front of 
1 you on this. 
2 THE COURT: As we stand now, you are correct. The 
3 facts are not going to change. 
4 MR. OLSON: Right. So, I think you are really in a 
5 position that you have to look at the undisputed facts as set 
6 forth before Your Honor and make a ruling based upon them. 
7 The fact of the matter is, that Thomas Hughes made an 
8 accounting according to the understandable practice of how 
9 that accounting will be done at the date of Cheryl Farr's 
10 death. These are the figures that were come up with. Our 
11 position is these are the figures that any accountant is 
12 going to come up with. It's liabilities versus debts. And 
13 it's not that complicated. 
14 THE COURT: And the only facts that we have establish 
15 these liabilities, this debt, and that's done. 
16 MR. OLSON: Right. And the debts exceeded these 
17 assets, therefore, there is a negative value. According to 
18 our agreement, one-quarter of that negative value is a debt 
19 against your estate. Your trust said pay the legitimate 
20 debts of your estate. And that's what was done. 
21 THE COURT: And any left over debt is to the 
22 detriment of these entities because they didn't get paid 
23 because there was not enough in the trust or the estate to do 
24 that? 
25 MR. OLSON: Well, there are other assets of the 
1 estate. But, frankly, you know, no probate was initiated. 
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And it wasn't done after. I mean, these are not the only 
assets that were there. There were other assets out there. 
You know, I really haven't analyzed this but, arguably, the 
entities potentially could go after the estate of Cheryl Farr 
for what they are owed. But I'm not sure that my clients are 
in a position of going and getting what inheritance these 
kids did get. But they are not wanting to give up what debts 
have been paid either. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, counsel, I do agree with you 
there is no use trying this case. Would not do us any good 
at all to try this matter as it stands now, because this 
can't be resurrected. The failure to do the regular 
valuations and the failure to have the regular reports, we 
can't go back and make that happen. It would be a 
meaningless act. 
I am going to take this under submission. Counsel, I 
am going spend some time with my law clerk chewing through 
both of your arguments. It is well done. You will get my 
memorandum decision within the next 60 days. But tell your 
clients not to hold their breath because I am going to be 
very careful in doing this. But tell your clients not to get 
ready to save up a bunch of money for trial either because I 
don't think a trial is going to do us any good. I think we 
have the record we need. You have given that to me. I'll 
rule as a matter of law where we stand. 
2 1 MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
3 1 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. We are in recess 
4 | until 11:30. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHAD FARR et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRUCE HUGHES et ah, 
Defendants. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 030500098 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment, filed 
June 30,2006, and plaintiffs' cross-motion lor summary judgment, filed July 26, 2006. 
Argument on the motions was heard November 11, 2006. Having reviewed the parties' motions, 
memoranda, and supporting materials, and being fully apprised in the particulars, the Court finds 
and rules as follows: 
UNCONTESTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs are the adult children of Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr and beneficiaries of the 
Sheryl Marie Bluth Farr Living Trust ("the trust"), dated December 5, 2000. Sheryl Farr died on 
October 18, 2001. 
2. Defendant Bruce Hughes was named as the successor trustee of the trust and acted as 
such upon Sheryl Farr's death. 
3. The trust document provides for payment of legal claims in these terms; 
6.1, Payment of Expenses, Claims, and Taxes. On my death, my Trustee is 
authorized, but not directed, to pay the following: 
6.1.2. Legal Claims. Legally enforceable claims against me or my estate. 
4. Further, under section 12.4 of trust, the trustee is required to report to the beneficiaries 
"at least semiannual 1v all of the receipts, disbursements, and distributions occurring during the 
reporting period, along with a complete statement of the trust property." 
5. Defendant The Academy At Cedar Mountain, Inc. ("The Academy"), is a Utah 
corporation doing business in Iron County. The Academy operated a private school in Cedar 
City. Prior to the death of Sheryl Farr, the shareholders of The Academy, each holding equal 
shares, were Sheryl Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Tuttle. 
6. Defendant Academy Equity Investors, LLC ('Academy Equity Investors"), was a Utah 
limited liability company; however, the company expired in 2005 for failure to renew. Academy 
Equity Investors was organized in order to receive contributions to finance the school as a whole. 
Prior to the death of Sheryl Farr, the shareholders of Academy Equity Investors, each holding 
equal shares, were also Sheiyl Farr, Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody 
Tuttle. 
7. Academy Acres, LLC ("Academy Acres") is a Utah limited liability company. 
Academy Acres owned the real estate on wmcn ine Academy operated, rnor to tne aeatn oi 
Sheryl Farr, the members of Academy Acres were the same live individuals- Sheryl Farr Bruce 
Hughes, Thomas Hughes, Thomas Fuller, and Jody Tuttle- and each held an equal interest. 
8. Bruce Hughes, Thomas Hughes, and Thomas Fuller were the directors of The 
2 
Academy 
9 Exhibit A to The Academy's bylaws, adopted by the directors on January 4, 2000, is a 
shareholdei buy-sell agreement with the following provisions [set forth below in the agreement's 
own, somewhat Victorian, style of capitalization], 
1.3 Transfers at Death. On the death of any Stockholder, the Stockholder's 
Personal Representative will be deemed to have offered to sell to The Academy 
all the deceased Stockholder's shares in the Company at the Agreement Price and 
on the Agreement Terms, as indicated in this section. 
1.3.1. The Academy shall have sixty (60) days from the date of the death 
of the deceased Stockholder in which to elect to buy all of the Offered 
Shares.... 
1.7 Ownership in Academy Acres. LLC. The Shareholders contemplate the 
formation of a real estate Limited Liability Company to be named Academy 
Acres, LLC, for the purpose of owning and operating real estate and real property 
for the use and lease by The Academy. Any transfer deemed to have occurred 
under this Section shall automatically trigger a Buyout of the Stockholder's 
ownership in Academy Acres LLC.... 
2.1 Annual Revisions. Each year the Stoclcholders shall meet and shall review 
the Agreement Price. If the Stoclcholders unanimously so agree, they shall modify 
the Agreement Price to reflect what they believe to be the then current fair market 
value of the Company minus all mortgages, debts, Stockholder loans and accrued 
payables of the Company. It is possible, from time to time, that the Agreement 
Price will be a negative value, which will represent an obligation of the 
transferring Stockholder or their [sic] estate to the company.... 
2.2. Automatic Adjustment. At the end of each fiscal year beginning after the 
date of this Agreement, if the Stoclcholders have not unanimously agreed to an 
adjustment in the Agreement Price for two consecutive fiscal years, pursuant to 
Section 2.1., the Agreement Price, as most recently adjusted, shall be valued by 
appraisal pursuant to Section 2.3. 
2.3. How Computed. The Agreement Price will be the fail market value of the 
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Offered Shares as determined by the independent certified public accountant 
("CPA") regularly employed by The Academy or, if The Academy has no 
regularly employed independent CPA, an independent CPA selected by The 
Academy for this purpose. This valuation shall be determined under the same 
methods as would be used for determining the estate tax value of the Offered 
Shares if the Offering Stoclcholder had died on the date the offer was deemed 
made, ignoring any alternate valuation date (under Code Section 2032) or special 
use valuation (under Code Section 2032A).... 
3.2. Negative Value Payment Due to The Academy. If the Agreed Value 
calculated or agreed to in Section 2 above, is a Negative Value, the terminating 
Stoclcholder or their [sic] estate will have an obligation payable to the Company. 
3.2.1. Due to the Death of a Stockholder. The Negative Value of the Shares of a 
deceased Stockholder shall, to the extent of the death benefit amount of the life 
insurance policies that any Stoclcholder has maintained under Section 4, be paid in 
cash or by good personal check. Any remaining amount of the Negative Value 
shall be a claim against the available assets of the Stockholder's estate. 
10. The initial members of Academy Acres also entered into an operating agreement 
which was effective as of August 1, 2000. This operating agreement contained a buy-sell 
agreement as its Exhibit A. Sections 1.3,1.3.1, 2.3, 3.2, and 3.2.1 of the Academy Acres buy-
sell agreement correspond nearly exactly with sections 1.3, 1.3.1, 2.3, 3.2. and 3.2.1, 
respectively, of The Academy's buy-sell agreement; however, Academy Acres' agreement 
substitutes "member" for "stoclcholder" and "interest" for "shares," 
11. Stoclcholder/member Thomas Fuller regularly provided and maintained the 
accounting books and records of The Academy and Academy Acres. Another stoclcholder/ 
member, Thomas Hughes, is an accountant, and regularly performed and maintained accounting 
books and records for The Academy, Academy Acres, and Academy Equity Investors. 
12. Neither Thomas Fuller nor Thomas Hughes is "an independent CPA." 
4 
13 Upon the death of Sheryl Farr, Thomas Fullei calculated her share of the negative 
value of The Academy and Academy Acres. 
14. In addition, Thomas Hughes prepared an accounting of The Academy's and 
Academy Acres' assets and liabilities. He states in his affidavit that he made a valuation "by the 
same methods as would be used for determining the estate tax value of the offered shares if the 
offering shareholder had died on the date the offer was deemed made, ignoring any alternate 
valuation date ... or special use valuation/' as required by the buy-sell agreements. 
15. According to Thomas Hughes' accounting, The Academy's liabilities exceeded its 
assets by $572,716.70 and Academy Acres' liabilities exceeded its assets by $177,861.62. He 
determined that the amount of the debt chargeable to the estate of Sheryl Fan was $113,543.34 
for The Academy and $35,572.32 for Academy Acres, a total of $349,115.66. 
16. Defendant Bruce Hughes transferred $6,000.00 from trust funds directly to The 
Academy in partial payment of Sheryl Fair's negative value in that entity. He also paid $ 115,000 
of the trust's funds to Academy Equity Investors as partial payment of the decedent's negative 
value in The Academy and Academy Acres. 
17. Bruce Hughes did not provide an accounting of his actions as trustee to the 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
18. No annual revisions were made to the agreement price as required by sections 2.1 of 
the respective buy-sell agreements; neither was any valuation of the agreement price made by 
appraisal as required by sections 2.2 of the respective buy-sell agreements. 
19. It is not clear whether The Academy elected to purchase the Sheiyl Fair's shares or 
interest within the 60-day provision of the buy-sell agreements at 1.3.1. 
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20, At the time he executed the checks to The Academy and to Equity Investors, Bruce 
Hughes held a pecuniary, ownership, and substantial beneficial interest in those companies and 
thus personally benefitted from such payment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Uniform Trust Code states, at U.C.A, § 75-7-802 (1) (2006), "A trustee shall 
administer the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries" (emphasis added). The Utah 
Supreme Court has also held that the duties of a trustee are extremely exacting: "Executors and 
trustees are charged as fiduciaries with one of the highest duties of care and loyalty known in the 
law," Pepper v. ZionsBank, 801 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1990) (emphasis added). Moreover, a 
"trustee ha[s] a duty to act with the utmost fidelity to protect and preserve the beneficiaries' 
interests,'5 id. (emphasis added). Defendant Bruce Hughes, as trustee, was therefore charged as a 
fiduciary with a strict duty of loyalty in his dealings with the plaintiffs as beneficiaries of the 
trust. 
The Uniform Trust Code states further that a transaction "affected by a conflict between 
the trustee's fiduciary and personal interests is voidable" by an aggrieved beneficiary § 75-7-802 
(2), unless, among other exceptions, it is authorized by the terms of the trust, id. at (2)(a). Here it 
is undisputed that Bruce Hughes had a personal interest in those entities paid with trust funds. 
While the terms of this trust permitted him to use trust funds to pay "legally enforceable claims," 
it does not authorize the trustee to pay those claims unless and until they were legally 
enforceable. Neither does it authorize him to pay an amount which may be greater than what is 
6 
legally enforceable. 
The buy-sell agreements do not give rise to an enforceable claim against a deceased 
member's o? shareholder's estate until certain conditions are fulfilled. By the agreements' terms 
the interest/shares are only deemed to be offered for sale "at the agreement price and on the 
agreement terms" (1.3). The agreement price is defined as "fair market value as determined by 
the independent certified public accountant" (2.3). Thomas Fullei and Thomas Hughes are not 
certified public accountants, nor are they even arguably independent. The Court is particularly 
disinclined to waive or ignore the buy-sell agreements' requirement of independence where the 
individuals who determined the amount of the debt and the individual who determined it was 
proper to pay it all had substantial financial interests at stake. 
Accordingly, the Court holds the buy-sell agreements were breached when trust funds 
were paid without a determination by an independent CPA. Further, the failure to apprise the 
beneficiaries of the trust debts, to provide semiannual accountings, and to obtain any independent 
review of the amount of the debt properly chargeable against Ms. Fair's estate represents a 
breach of the trustee's duties of loyalty and "utmost fidelity." 
ORDER 
1. Because of the trustee's breach of fiduciary duty and the breach of the buy-sell 
agreements, the payment to The Academy and to Academy Equity investors must be 
disgorged and returned to the trust. 
2. The buy-sell agreements must be followed. 
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3 It remains foi the parties to eithei litigate then obligations undei the buy-sell 
agieements, 01 to settle 01 mediate 
4 Defendants' motion foi summary judgment is denied 
DATED this / / day of December 2006 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable James L Shumate 
Fifth District Court Judge 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE BAILIFF: All rise. The Court will 
continue m session. Please be seated. 
THE COURT: Thank you, everyone, we're 
back on the record for the 20th of February and it is 
Farr versus Hughes, 030500098. 
Mr. Olson, you are here on behalf of the 
defendants. Even though all your pleadings on this 
thing say you're attorneys for plaintiff, I know 
you're attorneys for defendant. You want the Court 
to revisit the findings of fact m the Court's 
memorandum decision in this case because as I see it 
it's your position that the buy-sell agreements 
provided that there would be a two year continuous 
period of failure of the parties to agree on a value 
before there would be a submission to an independent 
CPA for valuation, and that the agreements were 
executed in August of 2001 and Mrs. Farr died in 
October of 2001. And, therefore, a two year period 
of time could not have passed, just as a matter of 
fact, this agreement had only been m place for 60 
plus days at the time of her death. 
Have I got that right, Counsel? 
MR. OLSON: Pretty close, Counsel. 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
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Actually the agreements, if I remember correctly, 
were signed in the fall of 2000. So there was about 1 
a year from the time they were 
of Sheryl Farr's death, but st 
two-year period. I think I've 
But essentially the 
that, hey, we can't call this 
signed until the time 
ill less than the 
got that right. 
Court's ruling was 
a legally enforceable 
claim against the estate because the buy-sell 
agreements were not complied with. In fact, looking 
at the Court's order on page 7 
agreements do not give rise to 
against the deceased member or 
until certain conditions are f 
conditions being that it be va 
certified public accountant. 
THE COURT: But the 
condition was that there would 
without any agreement as to va 
it says, The buy-sell 
an enforceable claim 
shareholder's estate 
ulfilled, one of those 
lued by an independent 
prequel to that 
be two years go by 
luation of the asset. 
MR. OLSON: That's exactly right, Your 
Honor. So I think that that p 
agreements were overlooked. A 
notes in its findings of fact 
the two different entities are 
with regard to how we calculat 
The agreement price 
ortion of the 
nd the Court correctly 
that the agreements for 
virtually identical 
s the agreement price. 
isn't calculated just 
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1 I pursuant to that paragraph 2.3 that's quoted. 
2 I Rather, the entire Section 2 goes to how do we 
3 calculate the agreement price, and it talks about the 
4 annual revisions and it talks about the parties to 
5 the agreement, or the members of these entities, 
6 coming to an agreement as to value, only if they do 
7 not do that for two consecutive fiscal years do we 
8 get to the point of needing an independent certified 
9 public accountant. 
10 THE COURT: But as I understand the facts 
11 in this case, no action was taken to reach any 
12 valuation whatsoever for two successive years at the 
13 time that the payments were made from the trust into 
14 the entities. 
15 MR. OLSON: But actually that's not 
16 correct. At the time of the death of Sheryl Farr, 
17 Thomas Hughes and Thomas Fuller sat down and made 
18 such an accounting, the accounting that was put 
19 before the Court in the affidavit -- I believe it's 
20 on Ms. Hughes, I get the two confused, or Thomas 
21 Fuller. There was an accounting made and all the 
22 members got together and said, Yeah, that's the value 
23 of the entity. 
24 THE COURT: Except, Counsel, how do we get 
25 around this self dealing that seems to be implicit of 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
1 your interpretation of the documents? Everybody who 
2 is a beneficiary of this particular process is an 
3 insider and the Farr trust is locked out in that 
4 process, and that's why Mr. Kuhlmann's clients are in 
5 I court. 
MR. OLSON: Sure. And I understand the 
Court's concern. 
The other problem that we have on the 
other end of this equation is how do we put parties 
10 I to an agreement that they didn't make? We have to 
11 I look at the buy-sell agreement and we have to abide 
12 | by what the parties agreed to do. 
13 I Now, by that same token, I think the way 
14 that we solve this problem, obviously in the 
15 litigation is, plaintiffs hire their expert, he goes 
16 in and looks at the accounting and says You've done 
17 correctly or no, it wasn't done correctly. But they 
18 never do that. Now, this case is four years old, 
19 discovery deadlines have long since passed, they've 
20 never gone in and audited the books to see if this 
21 calculation was correct or it wasn't correct. 
22 Rather, when we filed for summary judgment and we 
23 stated that the undisputed facts are here's the 
24 accounting, they didn't deny it. So it was an 
25 established fact for purposes of summary judgment 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
/ A n c \ /TOO ^i o A A 
7 
1 I that this was the calculation of the debt. 
2 | THE COURT: When it comes to established 
3 | facts for summary judgment, what about Mr. Kuhlmann's 
4 I argument that there was no compliance with Rule 11 
5 and we have a recent Utah Court of Appeals case that 
6 really does enforce rules -- I'm sorry, Rule 7, not 
7 Rule 11. Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
8 m the memorandum going back and forth, Mr. Kuhlmann 
9 makes the argument that there is and there is now 
10 supported case law to say that that's got to be done. 
11 MR. OLSON: I guess I'm not entirely sure 
12 what we're talking about here. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I'll let Mr. Kuhlmann 
14 fill us in. I understand your argument, Counsel, 
15 it's just that I'm not very comfortable with it in 
16 view of the insider nature of your accounting. I'm 
17 not sure that the agreements say that as I read it. 
18 Mr. Kuhlmann, you want to leave it where 
19 it is and you think that Rule 7 has not been complied 
20 with, and I'm on solid ground in ruling where I did 
21 in that fashion? Am I right, Counsel? 
22 MR. KUHLMANN: Your Honor, I'm at a loss 
23 as well on Rule 7. 
24 THE COURT: You --
25 MR. KUHLMANN: I don't recall --
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1 THE COURT: You came m with 'your 
2 memorandum m opposition. Under Rule URCP 7, each 
3 fact -- the defendants failed to dispute such factual 
4 statements m their responsive memoranda. Under 
5 URCP 7, each fact -- in the middle of your second 
6 page. Each fact set forth m the moving party's 
7 memorandum is deemed admitted for the purpose of 
8 summary judgment unless controverted by the 
9 responding party. That's what you are arguing. 
10 MR. KUHLMANN: Yes, Your Honor. And I am 
11 comfortable with standing on that. But let me -- can 
12 I address a couple of the facts, Your Honor? 
13 THE COURT: Go right ahead, Counsel. 
14 MR. KUHLMANN: We didn't do an audit, 
15 you're right. We didn't need to. I think, why go 
16 through the expense and incur all of that debt for my 
17 clients after we've already lost money when we didn't 
18 need to? 
19 It's very -- it's a very creative argument 
20 that's being made by Mr. Olson, but it's just plain 
21 wrong for several reasons. And a fact that has not 
22 been distinguished here and may be more clear in the 
23 Court's findings is that there is one buy-sell 
24 agreement that makes any difference m this case. 
25 Only one. Not --
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THE COURT: Because the other .entity is 
not existent . 
MR. KUHLMANN: The other entity didn't get 
payment. There was no payment made to Academy Acresi. 
So we don't care. They didn't buy out the shares. 
They didn't cut a check to Academy Acres. Academy 
Acres apparently didn't exercise its right to buy out 
the interest. 
The check was cut to Academy at Cedar 
Mountain where there was a buy-sell agreement. So 
we're talking about $6,000. The other check was cut 
to Academy Equity Investors, who does not have a 
buy-sell agreement. Never did. There was no 
obligation for Sheryl Fuller's estate to pay anything 
to them because there was no buy-sell agreement. Why 
wasn't there? Because the entities controlled by 
Mr. Hughes didn't create those documents for 
everybody to sign. 
The $115,000 simply was not due. That was 
paid to Academy Equity Investors. Now, what they 
have said is, but these are three entities but 
they're really all the same. Huh-uh, either play the 
game or you don't. If you're going to take advantage 
of the corporate and limited liability laws of the 
State of Utah, you are bound by them. They are 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
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separate, independent agencies. They're entities 
that cannot simply say, Oh, we're going to pay 
Academy Equity Investors but it's really money owed 
to Academy Acres or Academy at Cedar Mountain. So 
there was no basis to pay anyway and we don't care 
what the buy-sell agreement said for Academy Acres. 
THE COURT: The whole agreement upon which 
to make a claim? 
MR. KUHLMANN: Not in Academy Equity 
Investors, none, no buy-sell agreement. 
The other thing I would like to point out, 
Your Honor, is that there is a fairly creative 
reading of this document that was created by the 
entities. Not by Ms. Farr, but by the entities. But 
if you'll look at the provision on transfers of debt, 
it says the Academy -- this is the Academy at Cedar 
Mountain, this is the one that's in existence. It 
says they'll be deemed to have offered to sell to the 
Academy all of its C shareholders shares in the 
company at the agreed price, which is shown as 
defining terms, capital letters, on the agreed terms. 
Okay, again capital letters showing it as defined. 
Now, if you'll look at the provision on 
which they're relying for a two year mandatory 
waiting period, it's simply not there. There are 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
/ /i "~> r~ \ s~ /O r\ <-i rs JI 
1 I three different provisions. One says annual 
2 I revisions and it says how you're going to do it 
3 annually. It says, Each of the stockholders shall 
4 agree -- shall review the -- again, defined term, 
5 agreement price. If they unanimously agree, then 
6 they modify that price, okay? And it says this is 
7 what you're going to look at. So that's the annual 
revision. So they sit down and try and determine the 
agreement price. 
The second one, 2.2, says automatic 
adjustment, and it ties to each fiscal year beginninq 
after the date of the agreement as far as it's 
starting point. So beginning at the fiscal year 
after the date of the agreement, which according to 
the information I think was in the affidavit of Bruce 
Hughes, said it was January 4th, I believe, of 2000 
when Academy at Cedar Mountain signed their buy-sell 
agreement. 
So beginning on the fiscal year after 
that, then if they have not unanimously agreed under 
Section 1 of the annual revision, if they haven't 
agreed for two consecutive years, then you appraise 
the value as shown in Section 2.3, okay? 
THE COURT: With the independent CPA? 
MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly. But 2.3 is not 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
1 I part of the two-year provision. That's 2.2. In the 
2 event -- how do you calculate the defined, quote, 
3 agreement price? 2.3 tells you how regardless of 
4 whether you're doing it annually or whether you're 
5 doing it automatically. The only time that it's done 
6 automatically is if the members can't agree, and it's 
7 just telling you, you just do it the same way that 
8 the members are doing it. And how are they supposed 
9 to do it? By an independent certified accountant. 
10 THE COURT: So you rely on the Court's 
11 reading, even if this was the agreement, but it's 
12 only talking about $10,000 -- or $6,000 of over 
13 $130,000? 
14 MR. KUHLMANN: Exactly, Your Honor. I 
15 mean -- and the Court's ruling is not just based on 
16 this agreement. In here it finds there was no 
17 accounting by the trustee, the trustee didn't act for 
18 the benefit of the beneficiaries, finds that there 
19 was conflict of interest, all of which, regardless of 
20 this agreement, justified voiding the transactions 
21 and bringing the money back into the estate and 
22 charging the trustee with attorney's fees for it. 
23 So I don't think there's a problem here. 
24 THE COURT: Counsel, does the court's 
25 findings miss the difference between the entities and 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
/ A 1 Z \ (ZOO 1 O A A 
1 I the fact that the check went to an entity that did 
2 | not have a buy-sell? 
3 | MR. KUHLMANN: I think it is a little 
4 I unclear because it talks about both the agreements 
5 with Academy at Cedar Mountain and Academy Acres. 
6 There is a comment that Academy Equity Investors was 
7 in place and went out of existence in 2005, and it 
8 does say that it went there. But as I read through 
9 this, it tended to -- I don't think Academy Acres has 
10 any basis for anything. They didn't get payment. 
11 I mean, it's kind of been a mix of trying 
12 to say, Well, they were all the same entities, and 
13 that's kind of what the defendants' position has been 
14 throughout the case. But I don't think they have a 
15 claim whatsoever, and it --
16 THE COURT: Should I modify the findings 
17 and the final order to reflect the distinct point 
18 that you brought up at argument, Counsel? 
19 MR. KUHLMANN: I think it may -- may help, 
20 Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: All right. 
22 MR. KUHLMANN: My guess this case may go 
23 up on appeal, and I think it may help to make that 
24 d i s t i n c t i o n . 
25 THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . T h a t ' s y o u r 
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1 position. 
2 And, Mr. Olson, you take the position that 
3 your reading is the accurate one and that this 
4 tripwire simply was never tripped? 
5 MR. OLSON: Well, exactly, Your Honor. 
6 And I would like to address this other entity issue 
7 as well. In fact, I think we argued it probably ad 
8 nauseam when we came in for summary judgment. 
9 We never disputed the fact that the 
10 payment went to Academy Equity Investors, LLC, and 
11 that that entity wasn't owed under the buy-sell 
12 agreements. But the undisputed fact from our motion 
13 for summary judgment was that it went to pay off the 
14 debt at Academy Acres, LLC. 
15 THE COURT: So it was paid in behalf of 
16 Acres, LLC? 
17 MR.- OLSON: I mean, the best corollary if 
18 Mr. Kuhlmann owes me $10 and I owe you $10, and I say 
19 Mr. Kuhlmann pay it to Judge Shumate, what's the 
20 problem with doing that? 
21 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
22 MR. OLSON: They haven't suggested that 
23 that this isn't exactly what happened. In fact, my 
24 clients conceded, Yeah, the money that went to 
25 Academy Equity Investors, LLC, went to the debt of 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
1 I Academy Acres, LLC, no big deal. 
2 | So it's really of no consequence what 
3 I entity it went to, as long as the debt's satisfied. 
4 I THE COURT: And as far as you look at it, 
5 the real issue is whether or not that tripwire has 
6 been met? 
7 MR. OLSON: Yeah. So, you know, really 
8 getting back to the tripwire issue, Mr. Kuhlmann has 
9 taken us to the on account of death of a shareholder 
10 or member that it's going to be paid according to the 
11 agreement price, and then he takes you directly to 
12 2.3, saying, Hey, it says agreement price is 
13 calculated this way. 
14 But if we look at Section 2, the very 
15 title of that entire section is agreement price. 
16 It's not just 2.3 how we calculate it, itTs not jusr 
17 the two year independent CPA rule; rather, it's the 
18 annual revisions, the automatic adjustment, and then 
19 if two years go by, two fiscal years go by, without 
20 an agreement as to price, we get to the CPA. We 
21 never got there. 
22 THE COURT: How can there be an agreement 
23 as to price when Mrs. Farr is deceased after the 
24 first year and her legal representatives through her 
25 trust are no longer there? 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
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MR. OLSON: You know, and I agree that's 
an interesting question. At the time of her death 
her shares are deemed offered for sale to the entity 
at this price. 
And you're right under the agreement, how 
do we determine what that price is? Well, the 
members agree. We have four remaining members in 
that entity, and the members agreed on what the price 
was . 
THE COURT: Counsel, since your entities 
drafted the agreement and there appears to be at 
least some ambiguity as to how one looks at that 
agreement under the facts of this case, Mrs. Farr 
having died within the first two-year block, doesn't 
the agreement get construed against you? 
MR. OLSON: Well, the problem, Your Honor, 
is that Sheryl Farr, and really Mr. Kuhlmann's 
clients are an extension of Sheryl Farr, was in on 
the drafting. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. OLSON: I mean, everybody on this case 
was a draftsman. The heirs of Sheryl Farr may not 
have been, but they're not parties to that agreement 
either. Sheryl Farr was a party to the agreement, as 
were Mr. Hughes, Mr. Fuller, the other Mr. Hughes, 
*'ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC.** 
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1 and Ms. Tuttle. They were all the draftsmen of these 
2 agreements, they all entered into them, they all 
3 signed them. 
4 So there is not any party to construe it 
5 against as, you know, Ms. Farr was a part of this ag 
6 well. 
7 THE COURT: I see your point. 
8 MR. OLSON: Now, the only other issue 
9 that -- I mean, essentially we filed summary judgment 
10 under one of the two prongs of the conflict of 
11 interest statute. The conflict of interest statute 
12 says -- there's basically a couple of exceptions 
13 where the self dealing may occur. That's when the 
14 trust authorizes the transaction. And that's the 
15 argument we were making, the trust authorized payment 
16 of legally enforceable claims. The other one was if 
17 the parties consented. That issue hasn't been 
18 addressed. We certainly assert that they did, and 
19 that issue remains to be litigated. 
20 So I think the Court needs to understand 
21 that before we start issuing summary judgment on the 
22 entire case. That issue hasn't been addressed. We 
23 believe that there is certainly evidence that will 
24 suggest at the very least Chad Farr consented to 
25 this, knew full well what was going on. 
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1 I The other issues that I think the Court 
2 I needs to address if the Court is going to deny my 
3 motion today, and I can't think of any reason why 
4 they would. 'But if the Court is going to deny my 
5 motion today, where I'm a little curious in the 
6 Court's order it says the buy-sell agreements must be 
7 followed and remain from litigation, and I'm a little 
8 unclear as to what the Court was intending there. 
9 Are we not, then, going back and saying, okay, we 
10 need to find out whether the calculation was the 
11 right calculation? 
12 THE COURT: That's the way I saw it, 
13 Counsel. 
14 MR. OLSON: Okay. And so I guess under 
15 that theory, if we continued in litigation under the 
16 Court's order as set, we come into the court, we put 
17 on the evidence of whether that figure was the right 
18 figure. If it was the right figure, there is no 
19 money to be paid back. If it was the wrong figure, 
20 then there's money to be paid back. 
21 THE COURT: And the issue is what do we do 
22 with the money in the meantime? And the Court's 
23 order says to pay it back into the trust and to hold 
24 it until the trust until that litigation is done, we 
25 figure out what the price is. 
**ROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC. ** 
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1 I MR. OLSON: Right. 
2 I THE COURT: That's the way I see the 
3 litigation coming out. I don't see this case having 
4 been dissolved -- or resolved by my summary judgment . 
5 MR. OLSON: And, of course --
6 THE COURT: In fact, I have to say since 
7 she's here in the courtroom, my clerk and I both came 
8 to that conclusion at the time we were going over 
9 this order specifically, we decided that the next 
10 step is to find out what is the price. 
11 MR. OLSON: Okay. And then the only issule 
12 with regard to disgorgement, obviously, is, I mean, 
13 this payment was made back in '03. 
14 THE COURT: That's not an issue for the 
15 Court, Counsel. 
16 MR. OLSON: And I understand, and where 
17 does the money come from, is the question? Academy 
18 Equity Investors doesn't have it, it was paid to 
19 creditors. I mean, we can't go back to creditors and 
20 find it. 
21 THE COURT: Academy Equity Investors 
22 better find a line of credit. 
23 MR. OLSON: Well, and I understand where 
24 Your Honor is coming from. 
25 I guess the last point I would ask, Your 
* PROBERT STANLEY COURT REPORTING, INC. * * 
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Honor, if the order is going to stand despite the 
motion being filed, would the Court entertain 
certifying it as a final order? 
THE COURT: I can't, Counsel, not when my 
order itself says that we have to litigate the issue 
of whether or not the buy-sell agreements have been 
appropriately met. It may be moot if you're right 
and an expert suggested by the plaintiffs comes in 
and looks at what your clients did and said, yeah, 
that's the way you value it and they were right, then 
we're done. 
MR. OLSON: Okay. Fair enough, Your 
Honor 
THE COURT: It's, again, the place that my 
clerk and I got to was exactly where you're talking 
about, Counsel --
MR. OLSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: -- as we looked at it. 
MR. OLSON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thanks, everyone. The motion 
is overruled and denied. 
And, Counsel, in view of the fact that the 
court summary judgment has rather now narrowed our 
scope of our litigation, I think we probably ought to 
get a scheduling order for that evaluation and 
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litigation. Can the two of you sit down give me a 
scheduling order within the next 20 days? 
MR. OLSON: I would take it that the 
discovery deadlines are being extended? 
THE COURT: The discovery deadlines have 
to be extended so you can get out and get some expert 
testimony on this. 
MR. OLSON: Yeah, we can extend our order. 
THE COURT: You may want to get your own 
independent expert who's going to say exactly what 
your people said. 
MR. OLSON: Correct. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kuhlmann might find that 
he can't find one, in which case this case is over 
with. 
MR. OLSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Thanks, everyone. 
MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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2 PROCEEDINGS 
3 THE COURT: That's everything for another 10 minutes, 
4 unless, Mr. Olson and Mr. Kuhlmann, you really want to talk 
5 with me about the Farr and Hughes case now. But maybe you 
6 want to wait for your clients to get here? Do they want to 
7 I be here, do you know? 
MR. OLSON: My clients are here. Ready to go. 
9 1 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kuhlmann? 
10 MR. KUHLMANN: Ready to go forward. 
11 THE COURT: Counsel, let's use the time productively. 
12 Since we are ready to go, let me pull the file up. Counsel, 
13 give me just a second. I'm going to take a recess and go 
14 grab my courtesy copies off the desk because I have made some 
15 notes on those. I'll be right back. Don't stop (Inaudible). 
16 Everybody keep going. 
17 (Whereupon, an off the record discussion took place.) 
18 THE COURT: Okay. Let's go back to work. Mr. Olson, 
19 this is cross-referenced for summary judgment. But I think 
20 you were the first in time so you get the first in right. As 
21 I see it, the last time we addressed this case in February of 
22 2007, we had a pretty detailed discussion as to what was left 
23 in the litigation after the court's order on the motions for 
24 summary judgment. And the concern that I had was whether or 
25 not there was a justiciable issue that needed to be tried 
1 regarding the value that would be established from the 
2 buy/sell agreements. And your position is that after the 
3 amended scheduling order there was no designation of an 
4 expert by the plaintiffs, and you did have an expert review 
5 this matter who differed with Mr. Hughes' calculation by 
6 about $14,000, as I recall, but with no evidence on the other 
7 I side, that your client would be entitled to summary judgment 
based upon the valuations as you saw them in that review by 
the CPA. 
10 I MR. OLSON: If I can clarify it a little bit. Maybe 
11 walk us through it a little bit here, Your Honor. We filed a 
12 motion for summary judgment last year that brought us to that 
13 December order. And, at that point in time, our argument was 
14 here's what the calculations are. Put them in numbered 
15 paragraphs and summary judgment. Here's what they are. 
16 Affidavit from the person making them, who was my client. 
17 Said these are the figures. There was no opposition to each 
18 of those numbered paragraphs. And our position at that time 
19 was these are the figures. No one contested that they were 
20 the figures. Nonetheless, the court's order on December 6th 
21 said the buy/sell agreements need to be followed. The only 
22 remaining issue to litigate is the obligations under the 
23 buy/sell. 
24 We filed a motion to alter or amend because we 
25 disagreed with some of the reasoning of the court and wanted 
to make sure that we had it clear there was a conflict that 
2 we saw. That brought us into a hearing on February 20th. 
3 And in that hearing we asked for clarification as to exactly 
4 where we stand. In fact, the question was -- I got a 
5 transcript of that hearing. "But if the court is going to 
6 deny my motion today, where ITm a little curious in the 
7 court's order it says, 'The buy/sell agreement must be 
8 followed and remain free from litigation.1 And I am a little 
9 curious as to what the court was intending there. Are we not 
10 then going back and saying, okay, we need to find out whether 
11 the calculation was the right calculation?" 
12 Court responded, "That's the way I see it." 
13 So that the only thing left for trial in this case was 
14 the calculation, right? If it was, then the defendants keep 
15 the money. If it was wrong, then we need to figure out what it 
16 is and adjust the money. 
17 So, I went on to state, "So, I guess with that theory 
18 we continue under the litigation as the court's order as set. 
19 We come into court, put on the evidence as whether that was the 
20 right figure. If it was the right figure, there is no money to 
21 be paid back. If it was the wrong figure, then there is money 
22 to be paid back." 
23 And so, I think we had an understanding of where we 
24 were going from here. Now, based upon that framework, the 
25 court said, "We need to have somebody to come in and testify 
5 
1 as to what this calculation is. Is it right? Is it wrong? 
2 What's the deal? My argument, that point was we'll listen. 
3 I Expert discovery deadlines have run. Mr. Kuhlmann's client, 
Chad Farr, in deposition said, I have no basis to suggest 
5 1 this calculation is wrong. They have no way to dispute the 
6 calculation. So, my point back then was, case is over. 
7 I Plaintiff has the burden of proof. They can't prove the 
calculation is wrong. All we have is my client saying this 
is the calculation and no evidence otherwise. The court's 
decision at that point in time was let's get an expert in to 
take a look at it. The court extended discovery deadlines. 
And --
THE COURT: You went out and grabbed Mr. Hinton to 
look at it. And plaintiff never got anybody. 
MR. OLSON: Well, actually, in all fairness, what 
happened, the court entered an amended scheduling order in 
April that provided for a April 30th deadline for plaintiffs 
to designate and a June 15th deadline for them to produce a 
report. On April 30th, they did designate David Basal, CPA, 
as their expert. But June 15th came and went. And there was 
no report. My clients were never contacted. There was no 
designation at all whatsoever. We did designate Mr. Hinton. 
And even though June 15th came and went, of course, we were 
looking at it and saying we've got no report to rebut. But, 
nonetheless, let's have him take a look at it. We only have 
6 
1 a one month time frame under the amended scheduling order. 
2 1 Obviously, because we intended rebuttal. We would have a 
3 report from another expert. Our guys would sit down and say, 
4 yeah, it flies or it doesn't fly. Whether we hit the ground 
5 running brand new with your experts to go in and take a look 
6 at the thing. 
7 THE COURT: So, in lieu of a designated report, you 
8 have Mr. Hinton's affidavit. And that would serve as a 
9 report because he said this is what I looked at. This is 
10 what I saw. These are the values. 
11 MR. OLSON: Yeah. I agree with that. And even one 
12 more, Your Honor. We don't need Mr. Hinton's report. The 
13 plaintiffs have the burden of proof in this case. We are 
14 still back to where we were a year ago, that they have not 
15 got one shred of evidence, not one bit of testimony they can 
16 put on to say that the calculation is wrong. So, Mr. Hinton 
17 helps corroborate, but he's not even necessary. 
18 THE COURT: Well, counsel, I guess my real concern is 
19 the effect of the statute on this transaction. And when the 
20 statute is brought into play, is if there is a circumstance 
21 of potential self-dealing, which is exactly what the court 
22 was concerned about here. And if the court finds 
23 self-dealing, which I have, and ordered the disgorgement of 
24 the funds, which I have, then doesn't that establish a 
25 shifting of the burden of proof, the court having found that 
1 there was the threshold of self-dealing that Mr. Kuhlmann's 
2 clients were complaining about? And then your clients coming 
3 back saying, well, even if there is the appearance of 
4 self-dealing, we are still entitled to these funds under 
5 these agreements. And doesn't that shift the burden of proof 
6 1 at that stage when the court's orders them basically granting 
7 partial summary judgment, establish that line? So, basically 
8 where we stand today is that you have your CPA, Mr. Hinton, 
9 has looked at it, varied from Mr. Hughes' calculation by less 
10 than 10 percent, 1 think something like that, or around 
11 10 percent. And you are ready to go to trial now with that 
12 information. You can establish that, yeah, we did these 
13 things, but they were still proper under the agreements. It 
14 may have appeared to be self-dealing, but we are still 
15 entitled to these dollars under these agreements. And we are 
16 entitled to have this interest paid out under the agreement. 
17 Isn't that basically where we stand with it? 
18 MR. OLSON: Well, I think you are pretty close, Your 
19 Honor, except I don't think there is any law that says the 
20 burden of proof switches to the defendants in this case. 
21 Now, I went into that in some great deal in my reply. 
22 THE COURT: I did spend some quality time with it. 
23 MR. OLSON: I think what we need to understand is, 
24 under the statute, if the court finds that there is a 
25 conflict of interest, it makes the transaction voidable. Not 
8 
1 void. It makes it voidable, which means we need to look at 
2 it and say is it a transaction that should have happened or 
3 is it a transaction that shouldn't have happened. 
4 THE COURT: And if it should have happened, how much. 
5 MR. OLSON: Exactly. Exactly. Now, the only 
6 potential burden that shifts is a burden of persuasion. It 
7 J doesn't put a preponderance on my client's shoulders. He's 
still the defendant in this case. Rather, he needs to come 
9 1 through with evidence which is just a burden of persuasion to 
10 show this is a legitimate debt. His own coming forward and 
11 saying this is how we calculated it, this is what the books 
12 and records say, he's met his burden of persuasion. Now, 
13 plaintiff has to come back and say no, it's wrong. And they 
14 can't do that. If they had an expert examine it, perhaps 
15 they could have done that. But they have nothing at this 
16 stage of the game to say my clients' calculation is wrong. I 
17 think Mr. Hinton certainly corroborates what my client is 
18 saying. But I just don't think it's necessary. 
19 So, as we sit here today, almost a year later, 
20 plaintiffs, and, again, I think it's important to note that 
21 plaintiffs' experts were not for rebuttal purposes. It was for 
22 establishing their case. The scheduling order clearly required 
23 plaintiffs first to designate an expert, then defendants to 
24 designate an expert. 
25 Now, plaintiffs are going to come in and argue 
1 saying, well, we didn't need an expert until we got the 
2 defendant's report and had something to rebut. Well, that's 
3 not true. The scheduling order never even gave them a 
4 rebuttal deadline. They had to produce an expert in order to 
5 succeed in this case. In fact, if the court in the last 
6 hearing says, you know, Mr. Olson, you may want to get out 
7 and get an expert of your own. It clearly stated that, 
8 plaintiffs, you need to go out and get an expert. In fact, 
9 Your Honor stated it may be moot if you are right. "And an 
10 expert suggested by the plaintiffs comes in and looks at what 
111 your clients did, and said, yeah, that's the way you value 
12 it, and they were right, then we are done.1' 
13 1 That's exactly where we sit here today. They haven't 
14 produced that person to say the calculation for right or 
15 wrong, so it's moot. 
16 THE COURT: Well, counsel, Mr. Kuhlmann's named an 
17 expert. He's given you the name. He hasn't given you a 
18 report. You didn't give a report back either. And rather 
19 than filing over the reports now, I find this in the shape of 
20 summary judgment. And where this is a procedural dispute, 
21 I'm not sure that summary judgment is going to be where we 
22 need to go with it. I think we just need to get it on a 
23 trial calendar, let the experts come in and testify. If you 
24 want to get reports back and forth you can file motions for 
25 orders to compel and we'll get a report back and forth. 
10 
Frankly, I don't think your client needs to file a 
report because of the affidavit that you filed is sitting 
here. And I'm not inclined to strike that affidavit based on 
Mr. Kuhlmann's reply memorandum. I think that's basically 
information that would be discoverable anyway, and the fact 
that it's in affidavit form just puts it before the court 
more easily. But it appears to me as though we need to get a 
trial date set and go through this and walk through this 
whole process and say looking at Article II of this 
agreement, as we go through and evaluate the values of these 
various members' contributions, and their liabilities or the 
liabilities of their estates, don't we need to just go 
through and establish what it is and the court's ruling is 
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1 and records of the defendant. He's got no basis to make any 
2 opinion on anything. Not only that --
3 THE COURT: But I don't know that, counsel. Maybe 
4 you want to get his reports so you can find out what his 
5 report is. But without a report, I don't know what he's 
6 going to say. 
7 I MR. OLSON: Well, that's --
THE COURT: And that's why summary judgment may be 
bringing the cart before the horse. 
10 J MR. OLSON: Well, and that's true, Your Honor. But I 
11 guess what's curious is we had a report deadline. That 
12 deadline's come and past. We don't have a report. 
13 Rule 26(a)(3), witness and expert's testimony to his report, 
14 there is no report. So, it limits his testimony to 
15 absolutely nothing. 
16 THE COURT: And maybe you'll win your case on a 
17 motion in limine as opposed to a motion for summary judgment. 
18 MR. OLSON: Well, perhaps that's the route, Your 
19 Honor. You know, having been the unfortunate losing party in 
20 Pete vs. Youngblood at the court of appeals, if the report's 
21 not there and not properly designated, it doesn't come in. 
2 2 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
23 MR. OLSON: And, you know, I got the short end on 
24 that one. And I remember it well. So, I don't see between 
25 now and the time we get to trial there's going to be any 
12 
1 difference in testimony or facts than what the court has 
2 before it today, which is nothing. So, I think we are 
3 wasting our time going to trial. But I understand what the 
4 court's concerns are and where you are going with it. But --
5 THE COURT: I guess my real concern is, counsel, when 
6 we go to trial I want to give you a final judgment. I want 
7 I to have something that's established not on affidavits, not 
on arguments of counsel, not on records other than what was 
heard at trial, and make this one final and enforceable at 
10 1 that point. That's really what my concern is. 
11 Mr. Kuhlmann, I know you want to say various things 
12 about this whole process. But I still think we have to go to 
13 trial. Mr. Kuhlmann, you don't think we do because you don't 
14 think these are the right parties in interest. And I did 
15 read your memoranda with real care. But don't I need 
16 testimony to establish that this agreement that we have here 
17 is operable against either the estate or the trust? And if I 
18 find after the testimony comes in that this agreement that we 
19 are dealing with only goes to the estate, then I dismiss it 
20 at that point, motion for judgment, directed verdict? 
21 MR. KUHLMANN: I think that's (inaudible). I don't 
22 think we need to go to trial because you have already ruled 
23 and we are done. That's what I think. And this is why. 
24 There are four causes of action in the complaint. One of 
25 them is to void the transaction, which you have already done. 
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1 You have already found conflict of interest. And you have 
2 already, more importantly, found that the entities claiming 
3 their, (inaudible) buy/sell agreements, violated that 
4 buy/sell agreement by not valuing the claim the way they were 
5 supposed to. So, they did not have as you found, a legally 
6 enforceable claim because they failed to comply with their 
7 own contract. Based on that, that one's gone. And you have 
8 already ordered disgorgement of those funds. 
9 Count two's restitution only against Bruce Hughes. 
10 You ordered that. That's already taken place. 
11 Count three, or excuse me, count two is accounting, 
12 which has never occurred. But with the disgorgement, I don't 
13 know that we care. 
14 Count three is restitution, which you have ordered. 
15 Count four is damages, which I don't think the court 
16 is going to grant us anyway. There is a counterclaim. And 
17 the only thing in the counterclaim is for trustee's time, 
18I fees or time. 
19 Now, another important issue of this case, Your 
20 Honor, is that the majority of the amount in dispute was paid 
21 to Academy Acres. 
22 THE COURT: Well, counsel, the argument was made that 
23 this was paid to Academy Acres in order to satisfy a debt 
24 that was owed to Academy Acres by the entity that was 
25 entitled to receive under this distribution. 
14 
1 MR. KUHLMANN: It was, Your Honor. And that while 
2 it's an interesting argument, if you can find anywhere in 
3 anything filed before this court other than counsel's 
4 argument that that's the case, I'll agree that they made that 
5 claim. But there is not a statement of fact to that in any 
6 of their motions for summary judgment. The initial affidavit 
7 of Bruce Hughes, if you read through that, it talks about 
8 paying to the Academy entities. If you look at, and I've got 
9 the documents here if you want to look at them -- let me 
10 present them to you and you can go through them because 
11 you'll see, Your Honor, that that argument, that comment is 
12 simply not true. It can't be true. Based on -- I'm going to 
13 give you the accounting that they have done, the promissory 
14 notes that that accounting refers to and part of Mr. Hughes' 
15 deposition that was taken in this case. 
16 If you start with the accounting on page 2, it lists 
17 the itemization of what is owed to Academy Acres. What I 
18 have given Your Honor is three of the items that are listed. 
19 One is the nasty shade note. The large and trust note and 
20 the (inaudible) note. If you look at those three notes, 
21 those aren't Academy Equity Investors. There is nothing that 
22 shows debt there. Those are strictly Academy Acres debts. 
23 There is nothing that's been shown that Academy Acres owed 
24 Academy Equity Investors anything. If they had, they would 
25 have been listed on this accounting because it was a debt of 
15 
1 the company. The reason they used Academy Acres is, or, 
2 yeah, Academy Acres on this case is because Academy Equity 
3 Investors wasn't ever in existence for any substantial 
4 purpose. And it didn't do any business and didn't have a 
5 buy/sell agreement. 
6 If you look at the deposition of Bruce Hughes talking 
7 about why he made these payments and who was being paid, he 
8 says as far as Academy Investors goes, this is on page 44, we 
9 originally started developing property, formed Academy Acres, 
10 also formed Academy Equity Investors, associated with Academy 
11 Acres, and we since not used Academy Equity Investors, we 
12 just used Academy Acres. So Academy Equity Investors wasn't 
13 doing any business. He says the same thing on page 45. If 
14 you look at the bottom of that page starting line 22, "So, 
15 Academy Equity Investors was set up and didn't do anything?" 
16 "Well, it did for about six months period. Then we 
17 just folded it into Academy Acres." 
18 On page 46, "Did you file articles of dissolution?" 
19 "No. We hadn't filed articles of organization with 
20 Academy Equity Investors." 
21 "You had not?" 
22 "We had not." 
23 If you look at page 53, "So, what's the difference 
24 between that and what Academy Equity Investors was to do?" 
25 "Over time, there essentially became no difference, 
1 which is why we didn't continue with Academy Equity 
10 
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Investors. Initially, we thought there would be a 
distinction, but it turned out to be not." 
"When did you use Academy Investors?" 
"We didn't ever file a tax return for them, so it 
would have been by the end of the year 2001. It's created in 
2001." 
THE COURT: Prior to Mrs. Farr's death? 
MR. KUHLMANN: Mrs. Farr died in October 2001. You 
have a month and-a-half -- or, excuse me, two and-a-half 
11 months of time between the time she died and the time that 
this company wasn't renewed. Just never did anything else. 
No tax return filed, Your Honor. Well, if they received 
$115,000, isn't that income if it was money owed from Academy 
Acres? And if you look at what he did with the money on 
page 69, "At the time they were issued, what was the $115,000 
paid?" 
"It just went into the account. I don't know that it 
paid anything specifically." 
"Why was the check issued? What was the purpose of 
it?" 
"To pay that obligation." 
"To pay what?" 
"To pay this obligation." 
By that, you are referring to the invoice where it 
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1 shows $149,000, roughly dollars due?11 
2 It didn't go to Academy Acres. It went to pay what it 
3 said was owed between all the companies. 
4 "So, the 115 was an obligation?1' 
5 "Yes." 
6 Then, down further on the page, "So, just to make 
7 sure I'm understanding, 115,000 was to pay a portion of the 
8 invoice, the amount based on the documents that you 
9 understood required the estate to pay their share of debt?" 
10 Answer is, "Yes." 
11 He's not talking about, well, it went to Academy 
12 Acres or Academy Investors, because Academy Acres owed the 
13 money, because that's why we have Academy Acres documents and 
14 their balance sheets and final documents to determine that 
15 amount. That is simply not true. 
16 Finally page 72, "And they were paid $6000?" 
17 "Well, who the checks were written to was not a 
18 function of the specific amounts here. The debt and the way 
19 all this functioned was they were interrelated at this 
20 point," their claim from the start has been well 
21 (inaudible). And that's replete in the documents. Look to 
22 Mr. Hughes affidavit. That's what he said. He says these 
23 entities are all interrelated. You look at that document and 
24 not once does it say anything about Academy Acres owing money 
25 to Academy Equity Investors. Nowhere. The claim was, well, 
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1 it's kind of a pool. We were all the same owners. We had 
2 three different businesses but we treated them as one. 
3 That's what he's saying. 
4 You have already ruled, Your Honor. Now, let me step 
5 back one point. You have already ruled that from the trust 
6 perspective under the statute, the transaction is voidable. 
7 J And the money has come back. It's sitting there, but it's 
come back. Any claim by Academy Acres, Academy at Cedar 
9 I Mountain, Academy Equity Investors must be based upon a claim 
10 they have raised. You have already determined that the 
11 original calculations were invalid. There is no valid claim 
12 until they raise that claim and prove that claim. There is 
13 no claim before you. The only claim before you on the 
14 defendant's side is a counterclaim for trustee's fees which I 
15 don't think Your Honor can award based upon the fact that you 
16 found there was a breach of fiduciary duties here, because it 
17 was an interested transaction. There is nothing else to 
18 determine. Nothing. 
19 They haven't raised their claim. If there was a 
20 counterclaim like anywhere defendants saying, wait a minute. 
21 Not only are we owed this money but we are owed more. And 
22 they aren't saying that in any of their documents we are owed 
23 more than this. If they had that, any type of claim asserted 
24 before this court, then I would agree with you we have to go 
25 to trial. But once you have determined that the trust was 
1 breached by self-dealing, once you have determined that these 
2 defendants failed to comply with their own contract, there is 
3 nothing else for us to prove. They are in breach of 
4 contract, which means the estate owes nothing. The trust 
5 owes nothing until they comply with their contract. They 
6 can't do it now. They are too late. She died in '01. That 
7 limitation ran in '04. And it's clear in the buy/sell 
agreements themselves that the only entity liable for that 
debt is the estate. 
10 I Now, the claim's been made, well, yeah, the estate, 
11 the creditors can go after assets in a revocable trust on the 
12 date of. And it is on the date of death. That's true, but 
13 they haven't done it. 
14 THE COURT: Time period has run. 
15 MR. KUHLMANN: Yeah. They haven't done it. 
16 (Inaudible.) There is nothing else to determine here, Your 
17 Honor, except the amount of attorney's fees and interests due 
18 the plaintiffs because of the self-dealing transfer and the 
19 time that has run while that money has been held. That's the 
20 only thing to determine. The accountings are irrelevant. I 
21 think you hit it on the nose with regard to nobody produced 
22 anything. We don't have anything to produce, Your Honor. 
23 The required reports and the order drafted by Mr. Olson said 
24 we are required to file the reports. The filed reports under 
25 Rule 26 don't include dealing with anything in impeachment. 
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1 And that's the only thing we have to deal with. Because we 
2 don't have to prove what they may or may not be owed because 
3 you have already decided they breached their agreement. And 
4 if they breached their agreement, they are not entitled to 
5 recover one dime in Utah law until they cure that. And they 
6 I are too late to cure that now. We are done. 
THE COURT: All right. And, Mr. Olson, you think you 
are entitled under your summary judgment motion right now. 
MR. OLSON: Yes, Your Honor. It's a curious 
10 I argument. Essentially, what Mr. Kuhlmann is arguing here is 
11 that you ordered disgorgement of the funds. The plaintiffs 
12 now have $121,000 in their hands. And because my clients 
13 didn't sue them for that money, they can't get it. So, in 
14 other words, we had to bring a claim to sue them for money 
15 that we already had at the time this claim was brought. I 
16 mean, that argument doesn't make sense, Your Honor. We had 
17 no way to predict, well, the judge might make us disgorge 
18 this money so we should sue them for the money we already 
19 have. It doesn't make sense. 
20 I think the defendants are really confusing the 
21 difference, Your Honor, the difference between a void 
22 transaction and a voidable transaction. Your Honor has not 
23 voided anything. The statute specifically states that it is 
24 voidable. It is not void. So, the case is not over. In 
25 fact, defendants made this same argument back in court in 
1 February that were before the court, we don't need the 
2 accounting. They said the very same thing. They said we 
3 didn't do an audit. You are right, we didn't need to. I 
4 think why go through the expense and incur all of that debt 
5 for my clients after we already lost money when we didn't 
6 need to. It goes on to argue that we don't need an 
7 I accounting because of the conflict of interest. Well, the 
court quickly corrected that and said Mr. Kuhlmann may not be 
able to find an expert that will come in here and say that 
10 | accounting is wrong, in which case this case is over. We are 
11 done. Made it very clear that thatfs exactly what we needed 
12 as the only issue that was remaining from litigation was, 
13 what's the price? That's exactly what this court's order 
14 said. We still have to litigate what's the price. So, if 
15 Your Honor is going to buy into the defendant's argument 
16 today, you have to completely ignore the prior order that you 
17 made almost a year ago. And it's important to note that over 
18 and over again Your Honor said Mr. Kuhlmann, (inaudible) 
19 client can't find an expert, in which case this case is over 
20 with. 
21 THE COURT: And right now you say this case is over 
22 with. 
23 MR. OLSON: He doesn't have the expert. This case is 
24 over with. Now, we have gone ad nauseam over this issue of 
25 which entities were paid. Mr. Kuhlmann asserts that, Your 
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1 Honor, there is no fact before this court that suggests the 
2 amount paid to Academy Equity Investors paid the debt of 
3 Academy Acres LLC. We have (inaudible). The affidavit of 
4 Bruce Hughes in support of the last motion for summary 
5 judgment, of paragraph 27 said, "As trustee of the Cheryl 
6 Marie Bluth Farr Trust, I paid $115,000 to Academy Equity 
7 J Investors, LLC, asking for a partial payment upon the 
negative value of the decedent's interest in the Academy at 
9 1 Cedar Mountain and Academy Acres LLC." They did not 
10 controvert that statement of fact. 
Ill Under Rule 1, it is established fact. It is 
12 established fact that money was paid for the debt to those 
13 entities. Again, it's just we have argued this issue every 
14 step of the way. And it's a non-issue. It doesn't matter 
15 whose name was on the check as long as the debt is satisfied. 
16 Otherwise, it seems to suggest what this court is going to 
17 look at this transaction and determine whether it should be 
18 voidable and say okay, Academy Investors, you better make 
19 sure that those guys get paid. You are the one that got the 
20 money. Make sure they get paid. That's the only issue here. 
21 The entities aren't disputing whether they got paid or not 
22 that money. They got paid. So, it's a non-issue. 
23 Lastly Your Honor, and I think I have already gone 
24 over it ad nauseam, the defendants would suggest that we are 
25 done based upon the very same argument that they made back in 
ll February. Your Honor said no, we are not done. We have to 
2 litigate the buy/sell agreements. We have to determine what 
3 the price is. And, Mr. Kuhlmann, unless you can go out and 
4 find an expert to support your position, we are done. That's 
5 where we are today. We are done. They don't have an expert 
6 to support their position. They have not produced a report 
7 by the deadline. The only calculations before this court 
8 provided affidavits in support of summary judgment, not 
9 controverted by them. These are the figures. Court has an 
10 accounting. They have uncontroverted affidavit testimony 
11 that this is the accounting, did not hire their experts to 
12 contradict that. It's over. As the court stated last time, 
13 we are done. Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. I'll take it under 
15 advisement and issue a written ruling. 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASFIINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF'UTAH 
CHAD FARR, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BRUCE HUGHES, et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No: 030500098 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' and Defendants' competing motions for summary 
judgment. A hearing was held on the motions on January 8, 2008, at which both sides were 
represented by counsel. Having considered the arguments of counsel, the motions, memoranda, 
and other materials on file, the Court rules as follows: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
At the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Alter or Amend, held February 20, 2007, the 
Court determined that the issues in this case had been narrowed, and stated that the issue 
remaining for trial was the validity of Defendants' calculation of the debt, if any, owed by Ms. 
Fair's estate to the business entities. If the calculations were incorrect, as proved by an 
independent expert provided by Plaintiffs, Defendants might be required to repay to the Trust 
some amount, but if the calculations were correct, this case would be "over with" (Transcript of 
February 20, 2007 Hearing, p. 21,1. 14). Accordingly, on April 26, 2007, The Court entered a 
scheduling order that required Plaintiffs to designate an expert witness who could evaluate the 
correctness of Defendants' calculations by April 30, 2007 and to provide an expert report by June 
15, 2007. On May 1,2007, Plaintiffs designated Daemon J, Basile, CPA, as their expert; 
however, they did not provide an expert report by the June 15 deadline established by order of 
the Court. 
ANALYSIS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16(d) states, "If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a 
scheduling or pretrial order,... the court, upon motion or its own initiative, may take any action 
authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)." Under Rule 37(b)(2), "unless the court finds that the failure was 
substantially justified, the court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to 
the failure as are just," and among other actions, the Court may "dismiss the action or proceeding 
or any part thereof," id. at (C). 
The Court does not find that the failure to adhere to the established deadlines was 
substantially justified. Plaintiffs instead argue, somewhat bafflingly in light of this Court's 
previous orders, that they are not required to provide an expert report. This position is untenable 
given (1) the Court's clear directive at the February 20, 2007 hearing; (2) the Amended 
Scheduling Order with deadlines extended for the veiy purpose of allowing Plaintiffs to obtain an 
expert report. Having failed even now to produce evidence that the calculations are in fact 
2 
incorrect, Plaintiffs must suffer the consequence previously announced 
It is therefore ORDERED: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiffs' case is 
dismissed. 
2. Plaintiffs are directed to return the $121,000.00 which has been held in trust to 
Defendants. 
Dated this V day of February, 2008. 
JUDGE^MES L. SHUM&CE 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
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